Pre‐play promises, threats and commitments under partial credibility

The paper examines how pre‐play communication between players with partial credibility affects the ensuing strategic interaction. We consider an environment where players are uncertain about the economic and psychological costs of reneging on promises but learn these at the time of their implementat...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Economic inquiry 2024-01, Vol.62 (1), p.308-328
Hauptverfasser:	Melkonyan, Tigran, Chakravarty, Surajeet
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	collusion Communication Complementarity Credibility honesty informal agreements pre‐play communication strategic complementarity strategic substitutability
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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