Why Do Poor People Not Take up Benefits? Evidence from the Barcelona’s B-MINCOME Experiment

Non-take-up, i.e. individuals not applying for a benefit they are eligible for, is a widespread problem limiting the reach of welfare and protection systems. This paper seeks to understand it by means of a theoretical framework comprising two levels of analysis: the claimants’ individual characteris...

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of social policy 2024-01, Vol.53 (1), p.167-188
Hauptverfasser: LAÍN, BRU, JULIÀ, ALBERT
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description Non-take-up, i.e. individuals not applying for a benefit they are eligible for, is a widespread problem limiting the reach of welfare and protection systems. This paper seeks to understand it by means of a theoretical framework comprising two levels of analysis: the claimants’ individual characteristics in relation to the information barriers they face, and the administrative logic and functioning regarding the communications strategy used by public institutions. To test the hypotheses of these two levels of analysis, the paper analyses the B-MINCOME pilot scheme, a cash transfer programme implemented in the city of Barcelona between 2017 and 2019. Findings indicate that, although claimants’ characteristics may play a significant role, the administrative functioning and the communications strategy are fundamental in determining take-up rates. The conclusions briefly address some of the technical and moral concerns raised by non-take-up.
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source PAIS Index; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Sociological Abstracts; Applied Social Sciences Index & Abstracts (ASSIA); Cambridge University Press Journals Complete
subjects Antipoverty programs
Claimants
Communication strategies
Costs
Expected utility
Homeless people
Households
Hypotheses
Low income groups
Management
Opportunity costs
Social policy
Sociodemographics
Stigma
Welfare
title Why Do Poor People Not Take up Benefits? Evidence from the Barcelona’s B-MINCOME Experiment
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