Considerații referitoare la actuala reglementare a instituției posesiei

After a comparative and critical examination of the definition of possession in the former and current Civil Code, the study bent towards the clarification of the concept of de facto possession. Unlike the holder of the right, who exercises the attribute of possession on the basis of the power conferred by law, in the case of de facto possession there is a de facto ownership that does not grant him the exercise of certain powers over the asset, but which are nevertheless exercised in the form of material or legal acts by the direct owner of the property, in his own power or through another person, as if he had a right that he does not really have. The force of the de facto power is prior to the one de jure, because the owner who lost possession risks losing the right in favour of the possessor who exercised the de facto power over the thing. The aspects related to the acquisition of possession were associated with the simultaneous existence of the two elements, animus and corpus, as well as with the function of the element animus, with personal nature of subsistence of the possession in case of interruption of the acts of use regarding the corpus element or its exercise through others, as in the case of precarious detention. In the same framework, it was addressed the mechanism of operation of the two elements of possession in the case of co-ownership, joint property and of the right of claim in relation to a certain tangible asset. The causes for cessation of possession, stated by Article 921 of the Civil Code, were examined in relation to the classification of assets into movable and immovable and with the impact of the loss of the corpus element as regards the movable assets, the possession of which, under the conditions of Article 935 of the Civil Code, is not distinct from the issue of property. The vices affect the useful nature of the possession, which must be continuous, peaceful and under the name of owner. After explaining the content of each vice, it was specified that the interruption of possession and the ownership other than under the name of owner, retained in the former Civil Code as vices of possession, are in reality causes for the cessation of possession, while the ambiguity retained by doctrine and jurisprudence as being defining for the utility of the possession is in reality a factor that intervenes when one of the qualities of the possession is doubtful. Discontinuity as a vice of possession has meaning depending on the nature of the