When social assistance meets market power: A mixed duopoly view of health insurance in the United States
We develop a mixed duopoly model with quality‐differentiated products. The public firm offers its product for free to eligible individuals, while the private firm chooses its product quality and price to maximize profit. We calibrate the model to health insurance for the U.S. working‐age population,...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | Economic inquiry 2023-10, Vol.61 (4), p.851-869 |
|---|---|
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 869 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 4 |
| container_start_page | 851 |
| container_title | Economic inquiry |
| container_volume | 61 |
| creator | Ranasinghe, Ashantha Su, Xuejuan |
| description | We develop a mixed duopoly model with quality‐differentiated products. The public firm offers its product for free to eligible individuals, while the private firm chooses its product quality and price to maximize profit. We calibrate the model to health insurance for the U.S. working‐age population, with Medicaid being the public firm. We examine distributional implications of policies that expand Medicaid to various degrees. Despite potentially significant inefficiency of Medicaid, its expansion is welfare improving. Central to these findings is the significant market power of the private firm when left unchecked, which is increasingly disciplined as more individuals become Medicaid eligible. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/ecin.13158 |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2859254878</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>2859254878</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c3868-28f3879aec8fa3f16bd95a328a31857c58c353c2a3e5741a8f307a59ab470aab3</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNp90D1PwzAQBmALgUQpLPwCS2xIKf6IE4etqvioVMEAFWzR1b0oLmlcYofSf0_aILHh5Zbn3pNfQi45G_Hu3aCx9YhLrvQRGfA4UVEqMnVMBoxlKhJKy1Ny5v2KMSYTpQakfCuxpt4ZCxUF760PUBuka8Tg6RqaDwx047bY3NIxXdtvXNJl6zau2tEvi1vqCloiVKGktvZtc1i2NQ0l0nltQ8dfAgT05-SkgMrjxe8ckvn93evkMZo9P0wn41lkpE50JHQhdZoBGl2ALHiyWGYKpNAguVapUdpIJY0AiSqNOXScpaAyWMQpA1jIIbnqczeN-2zRh3zl2qbuTuZCq0yoWKe6U9e9Mo3zvsEi3zS2--0u5yzfN5nvm8wPTXaY9hiNq63_ozpRqdBMv3eE92RrK9z9E5bfTaZPfewPWsCAxQ</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>2859254878</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>When social assistance meets market power: A mixed duopoly view of health insurance in the United States</title><source>PAIS Index</source><source>Access via Wiley Online Library</source><creator>Ranasinghe, Ashantha ; Su, Xuejuan</creator><creatorcontrib>Ranasinghe, Ashantha ; Su, Xuejuan</creatorcontrib><description>We develop a mixed duopoly model with quality‐differentiated products. The public firm offers its product for free to eligible individuals, while the private firm chooses its product quality and price to maximize profit. We calibrate the model to health insurance for the U.S. working‐age population, with Medicaid being the public firm. We examine distributional implications of policies that expand Medicaid to various degrees. Despite potentially significant inefficiency of Medicaid, its expansion is welfare improving. Central to these findings is the significant market power of the private firm when left unchecked, which is increasingly disciplined as more individuals become Medicaid eligible.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0095-2583</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1465-7295</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1111/ecin.13158</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Huntington Beach: Western Economic Association</publisher><subject>distributional effects ; Duopoly ; Health care industry ; Health care policy ; Health insurance ; Markets ; Medicaid ; mixed duopoly ; Power ; public provision of private goods ; Quality ; quality differentiation ; Social power ; Welfare benefits</subject><ispartof>Economic inquiry, 2023-10, Vol.61 (4), p.851-869</ispartof><rights>2023 The Authors. Economic Inquiry published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Western Economic Association International.</rights><rights>2023. This article is published under http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ (the “License”). Notwithstanding the ProQuest Terms and Conditions, you may use this content in accordance with the terms of the License.</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c3868-28f3879aec8fa3f16bd95a328a31857c58c353c2a3e5741a8f307a59ab470aab3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111%2Fecin.13158$$EPDF$$P50$$Gwiley$$Hfree_for_read</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111%2Fecin.13158$$EHTML$$P50$$Gwiley$$Hfree_for_read</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>315,781,785,1418,27870,27928,27929,45578,45579</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Ranasinghe, Ashantha</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Su, Xuejuan</creatorcontrib><title>When social assistance meets market power: A mixed duopoly view of health insurance in the United States</title><title>Economic inquiry</title><description>We develop a mixed duopoly model with quality‐differentiated products. The public firm offers its product for free to eligible individuals, while the private firm chooses its product quality and price to maximize profit. We calibrate the model to health insurance for the U.S. working‐age population, with Medicaid being the public firm. We examine distributional implications of policies that expand Medicaid to various degrees. Despite potentially significant inefficiency of Medicaid, its expansion is welfare improving. Central to these findings is the significant market power of the private firm when left unchecked, which is increasingly disciplined as more individuals become Medicaid eligible.</description><subject>distributional effects</subject><subject>Duopoly</subject><subject>Health care industry</subject><subject>Health care policy</subject><subject>Health insurance</subject><subject>Markets</subject><subject>Medicaid</subject><subject>mixed duopoly</subject><subject>Power</subject><subject>public provision of private goods</subject><subject>Quality</subject><subject>quality differentiation</subject><subject>Social power</subject><subject>Welfare benefits</subject><issn>0095-2583</issn><issn>1465-7295</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2023</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>24P</sourceid><sourceid>WIN</sourceid><sourceid>7TQ</sourceid><recordid>eNp90D1PwzAQBmALgUQpLPwCS2xIKf6IE4etqvioVMEAFWzR1b0oLmlcYofSf0_aILHh5Zbn3pNfQi45G_Hu3aCx9YhLrvQRGfA4UVEqMnVMBoxlKhJKy1Ny5v2KMSYTpQakfCuxpt4ZCxUF760PUBuka8Tg6RqaDwx047bY3NIxXdtvXNJl6zau2tEvi1vqCloiVKGktvZtc1i2NQ0l0nltQ8dfAgT05-SkgMrjxe8ckvn93evkMZo9P0wn41lkpE50JHQhdZoBGl2ALHiyWGYKpNAguVapUdpIJY0AiSqNOXScpaAyWMQpA1jIIbnqczeN-2zRh3zl2qbuTuZCq0yoWKe6U9e9Mo3zvsEi3zS2--0u5yzfN5nvm8wPTXaY9hiNq63_ozpRqdBMv3eE92RrK9z9E5bfTaZPfewPWsCAxQ</recordid><startdate>202310</startdate><enddate>202310</enddate><creator>Ranasinghe, Ashantha</creator><creator>Su, Xuejuan</creator><general>Western Economic Association</general><scope>24P</scope><scope>WIN</scope><scope>OQ6</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7TQ</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>DHY</scope><scope>DON</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>K9.</scope></search><sort><creationdate>202310</creationdate><title>When social assistance meets market power: A mixed duopoly view of health insurance in the United States</title><author>Ranasinghe, Ashantha ; Su, Xuejuan</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c3868-28f3879aec8fa3f16bd95a328a31857c58c353c2a3e5741a8f307a59ab470aab3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2023</creationdate><topic>distributional effects</topic><topic>Duopoly</topic><topic>Health care industry</topic><topic>Health care policy</topic><topic>Health insurance</topic><topic>Markets</topic><topic>Medicaid</topic><topic>mixed duopoly</topic><topic>Power</topic><topic>public provision of private goods</topic><topic>Quality</topic><topic>quality differentiation</topic><topic>Social power</topic><topic>Welfare benefits</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Ranasinghe, Ashantha</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Su, Xuejuan</creatorcontrib><collection>Wiley Online Library (Open Access Collection)</collection><collection>Wiley Online Library (Open Access Collection)</collection><collection>ECONIS</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>PAIS Index</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>PAIS International</collection><collection>PAIS International (Ovid)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>ProQuest Health & Medical Complete (Alumni)</collection><jtitle>Economic inquiry</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Ranasinghe, Ashantha</au><au>Su, Xuejuan</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>When social assistance meets market power: A mixed duopoly view of health insurance in the United States</atitle><jtitle>Economic inquiry</jtitle><date>2023-10</date><risdate>2023</risdate><volume>61</volume><issue>4</issue><spage>851</spage><epage>869</epage><pages>851-869</pages><issn>0095-2583</issn><eissn>1465-7295</eissn><abstract>We develop a mixed duopoly model with quality‐differentiated products. The public firm offers its product for free to eligible individuals, while the private firm chooses its product quality and price to maximize profit. We calibrate the model to health insurance for the U.S. working‐age population, with Medicaid being the public firm. We examine distributional implications of policies that expand Medicaid to various degrees. Despite potentially significant inefficiency of Medicaid, its expansion is welfare improving. Central to these findings is the significant market power of the private firm when left unchecked, which is increasingly disciplined as more individuals become Medicaid eligible.</abstract><cop>Huntington Beach</cop><pub>Western Economic Association</pub><doi>10.1111/ecin.13158</doi><tpages>19</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0095-2583 |
| ispartof | Economic inquiry, 2023-10, Vol.61 (4), p.851-869 |
| issn | 0095-2583 1465-7295 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_2859254878 |
| source | PAIS Index; Access via Wiley Online Library |
| subjects | distributional effects Duopoly Health care industry Health care policy Health insurance Markets Medicaid mixed duopoly Power public provision of private goods Quality quality differentiation Social power Welfare benefits |
| title | When social assistance meets market power: A mixed duopoly view of health insurance in the United States |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-12-17T05%3A55%3A57IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=When%20social%20assistance%20meets%20market%20power:%20A%20mixed%20duopoly%20view%20of%20health%20insurance%20in%20the%20United%20States&rft.jtitle=Economic%20inquiry&rft.au=Ranasinghe,%20Ashantha&rft.date=2023-10&rft.volume=61&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=851&rft.epage=869&rft.pages=851-869&rft.issn=0095-2583&rft.eissn=1465-7295&rft_id=info:doi/10.1111/ecin.13158&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E2859254878%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=2859254878&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true |