Cournot–Bertrand comparisons under double managerial delegation contracts with sales and environmental incentives
This study investigates the effect of consumers' willingness to pay (WTP) for green products on double managerial delegation contracts with sales and environmental incentives. We illustrate that Cournot firms set higher sales and lower environmental incentives than Bertrand firms, yielding high...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Managerial and decision economics 2023-09, Vol.44 (6), p.3409-3421 |
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| container_title | Managerial and decision economics |
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| creator | Xu, Lili Lee, Sang‐Ho |
| description | This study investigates the effect of consumers' willingness to pay (WTP) for green products on double managerial delegation contracts with sales and environmental incentives. We illustrate that Cournot firms set higher sales and lower environmental incentives than Bertrand firms, yielding higher profits and better environmental performance under Cournot. We also examine an endogenous competition mode and discover that Cournot is an equilibrium when consumers' WTP is low, while the welfare‐inferior Bertrand appears unless consumers' WTP or product substitutability is high. Our finding suggests that antitrust authorities should monitor welfare‐distorting coordination when firms reformulate their strategies for emission‐reduction activities under double managerial delegation contracts. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1002/mde.3887 |
| format | Article |
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Our finding suggests that antitrust authorities should monitor welfare‐distorting coordination when firms reformulate their strategies for emission‐reduction activities under double managerial delegation contracts.</description><subject>Anreiz</subject><subject>Bertrand-Wettbewerb</subject><subject>Companies</subject><subject>Consumers</subject><subject>Contracts</subject><subject>Coordination</subject><subject>Cournot-Wettbewerb</subject><subject>Delegation</subject><subject>Endogenous</subject><subject>Immissionsschutz</subject><subject>Incentives</subject><subject>Konsumentenverhalten</subject><subject>Profits</subject><subject>Sales</subject><subject>Theorie</subject><subject>Welfare</subject><subject>Willingness to pay</subject><subject>Zahlungsbereitschaftsanalyse</subject><subject>Öko-Produkt</subject><issn>0143-6570</issn><issn>1099-1468</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2023</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNp10M1OAyEUBWBiNLFWEx-BxI2bqTAwHVhqrT9JjRtdTxi4U2lmoMK0TXe-g2_ok0itiStXsPjugXsQOqdkRAnJrzoDIyZEeYAGlEiZUT4Wh2hAKGfZuCjJMTqJcUEI4YLLAYoTvwrO918fnzcQ-qCcwdp3SxVs9C7ilTMQsPGrugXcKafmEKxqsYEW5qq33iXu0pzuI97Y_g1H1ULEuxxwaxu868D1acI6nS52DfEUHTWqjXD2ew7R6930ZfKQzZ7vHyfXs0xzWpYZbWqqdVkbImvN0981kwUwQ5pSCW6MJErVQhhjmISCjuskaykZyzXkqinYEF3sc5fBv68g9tVit2x6ssoF5yxRmSd1uVc6-BgDNNUy2E6FbUVJtau0SpVWu0oTxXsKaWcb_6AopMiLFJlIticb28L236jq6Xb6E_kNnzqGlQ</recordid><startdate>202309</startdate><enddate>202309</enddate><creator>Xu, Lili</creator><creator>Lee, Sang‐Ho</creator><general>Wiley Periodicals Inc</general><scope>OQ6</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0283-5998</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9660-3145</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>202309</creationdate><title>Cournot–Bertrand comparisons under double managerial delegation contracts with sales and environmental incentives</title><author>Xu, Lili ; Lee, Sang‐Ho</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c4177-1fb1cc7bd09bc4657c395e3d0f7a84dd90aab88ddd39e516bbd0b99332ce2af53</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2023</creationdate><topic>Anreiz</topic><topic>Bertrand-Wettbewerb</topic><topic>Companies</topic><topic>Consumers</topic><topic>Contracts</topic><topic>Coordination</topic><topic>Cournot-Wettbewerb</topic><topic>Delegation</topic><topic>Endogenous</topic><topic>Immissionsschutz</topic><topic>Incentives</topic><topic>Konsumentenverhalten</topic><topic>Profits</topic><topic>Sales</topic><topic>Theorie</topic><topic>Welfare</topic><topic>Willingness to pay</topic><topic>Zahlungsbereitschaftsanalyse</topic><topic>Öko-Produkt</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Xu, Lili</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Lee, Sang‐Ho</creatorcontrib><collection>ECONIS</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Managerial and decision economics</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Xu, Lili</au><au>Lee, Sang‐Ho</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Cournot–Bertrand comparisons under double managerial delegation contracts with sales and environmental incentives</atitle><jtitle>Managerial and decision economics</jtitle><date>2023-09</date><risdate>2023</risdate><volume>44</volume><issue>6</issue><spage>3409</spage><epage>3421</epage><pages>3409-3421</pages><issn>0143-6570</issn><eissn>1099-1468</eissn><abstract>This study investigates the effect of consumers' willingness to pay (WTP) for green products on double managerial delegation contracts with sales and environmental incentives. 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| identifier | ISSN: 0143-6570 |
| ispartof | Managerial and decision economics, 2023-09, Vol.44 (6), p.3409-3421 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | Business Source Complete; Access via Wiley Online Library |
| subjects | Anreiz Bertrand-Wettbewerb Companies Consumers Contracts Coordination Cournot-Wettbewerb Delegation Endogenous Immissionsschutz Incentives Konsumentenverhalten Profits Sales Theorie Welfare Willingness to pay Zahlungsbereitschaftsanalyse Öko-Produkt |
| title | Cournot–Bertrand comparisons under double managerial delegation contracts with sales and environmental incentives |
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