Learning in Repeated Multi-Unit Pay-As-Bid Auctions

Motivated by Carbon Emissions Trading Schemes, Treasury Auctions, Procurement Auctions, and Wholesale Electricity Markets, which all involve the auctioning of homogeneous multiple units, we consider the problem of learning how to bid in repeated multi-unit pay-as-bid auctions. In each of these aucti...

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Veröffentlicht in:	arXiv.org 2024-11
Hauptverfasser:	Galgana, Rigel, Golrezaei, Negin
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Algorithms Auctioning Auctions Bids Combinatorial analysis Distance learning Dynamic programming Emissions control Emissions trading Lower bounds Machine learning Optimization Polynomials Upper bounds
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