The optimal earnings test and retirement behavior

This paper quantitatively derives the welfare-improving earnings test within an optimal income tax framework. I construct a life cycle model of labor supply and savings to compute social welfare. The preference parameters are estimated by the method of simulated moments using Japanese data. I find t...

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Veröffentlicht in:International tax and public finance 2023-08, Vol.30 (4), p.1036-1068
1. Verfasser: Okada, Masayuki
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description This paper quantitatively derives the welfare-improving earnings test within an optimal income tax framework. I construct a life cycle model of labor supply and savings to compute social welfare. The preference parameters are estimated by the method of simulated moments using Japanese data. I find that social welfare under the current earnings test with large changes of marginal tax rates at thresholds is substantially lower than social welfare under the earnings test with a linear tax rate. In addition, an earnings test with negative marginal tax rates will increase social welfare more than a system without negative marginal tax rates.
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source PAIS Index; SpringerNature Journals
subjects Age
Business Taxation/Tax Law
Decision making
Earnings
Economics
Economics and Finance
Elasticity
Expenditures
Income taxes
Labor force
Labor supply
Older people
Public Finance
Reforms
Retirement
Social security
Social welfare
Tax rates
Tax revenues
Taxation
Tests
Thresholds
title The optimal earnings test and retirement behavior
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