The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders

Two informed and interested parties (senders) repeatedly send messages to an uninformed party (public). Senders face a trade-off between propagating their favoured opinions, possibly by lying, and maintaining a high audience (or market share), as the state is occasionally revealed and lies cause aud...

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Veröffentlicht in:	International journal of game theory 2023-06, Vol.52 (2), p.463-483
Hauptverfasser:	Polanski, Arnold, Le Quement, Mark
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Audiences Behavioral/Experimental Economics Bias Credibility Economic conditions Economic growth Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Equilibrium Expected values Game Theory Ideology Labor force Lying Market shares Operations Research/Decision Theory Original Paper Polarization Research parks Social and Behav. Sciences Unemployment
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