Does Public Company Accounting Oversight Board Regulatory Enforcement Deter Low-Quality Audits?

Regulatory economics suggests that one benefit of public enforcement is the deterrence of improper conduct. Using a difference-in-differences (DiD) design, we investigate whether a deterrence effect follows the revelation of Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) enforcement. We find that...

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Veröffentlicht in:	The Accounting review 2023-05, Vol.98 (3), p.335-366
Hauptverfasser:	Lamoreaux, Phillip T., Mowchan, Michael, Zhang, Wei
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Accounting Audit engagements Audit quality Auditors Audits Competitors Deterrence Enforcement Media coverage Naming News Proximity Public companies
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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