Secure Revocation Features in eKYC - Privacy Protection in Central Bank Digital Currency

Central bank digital currencies require the implementation of eKYC to verify whether a trading customer is eligible online. When an organization issues an ID proof of a customer for eKYC, that proof is usually achieved in practice by a hierarchy of issuers. However, the customer wants to disclose on...

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Veröffentlicht in:IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences Communications and Computer Sciences, 2023/03/01, Vol.E106.A(3), pp.325-332
Hauptverfasser: TAKARAGI, Kazuo, KUBOTA, Takashi, WOHLGEMUTH, Sven, UMEZAWA, Katsuyuki, KOYANAGI, Hiroki
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container_title IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
container_volume E106.A
creator TAKARAGI, Kazuo
KUBOTA, Takashi
WOHLGEMUTH, Sven
UMEZAWA, Katsuyuki
KOYANAGI, Hiroki
description Central bank digital currencies require the implementation of eKYC to verify whether a trading customer is eligible online. When an organization issues an ID proof of a customer for eKYC, that proof is usually achieved in practice by a hierarchy of issuers. However, the customer wants to disclose only part of the issuer's chain and documents to the trading partner due to privacy concerns. In this research, delegatable anonymous credential (DAC) and zero-knowledge range proof (ZKRP) allow customers to arbitrarily change parts of the delegation chain and message body to range proofs expressed in inequalities. That way, customers can protect the privacy they need with their own control. Zero-knowledge proof is applied to prove the inequality between two time stamps by the time stamp server (signature presentation, public key revocation, or non-revocation) without disclosing the signature content and stamped time. It makes it possible to prove that the registration information of the national ID card is valid or invalid while keeping the user's personal information anonymous. This research aims to contribute to the realization of a sustainable financial system based on self-sovereign identity management with privacy-enhanced PKI.
doi_str_mv 10.1587/transfun.2022CIP0008
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source J-STAGE (Japan Science & Technology Information Aggregator, Electronic) Freely Available Titles - Japanese
subjects anonymous credential
central bank digital currency
Central banks
Chains
Customers
Digital currencies
eKYC
PKI
Privacy
zero-knowledge range proof
title Secure Revocation Features in eKYC - Privacy Protection in Central Bank Digital Currency
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