The mandatory bid rule under China's takeover law: A comparative and empirical perspective

In a two-tier partial bid, the acquirer may set different bid prices for the controlling shareholder and the minority shareholders.7 Minority shareholders usually lack information about the decisions of their peers and feel strongly coerced to sell their shares for fear of being locked in the target...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:The International lawyer 2020-06, Vol.53 (2), p.195-233
Hauptverfasser: Huang, Robin Hui, Wang, Charles Chao
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
container_end_page 233
container_issue 2
container_start_page 195
container_title The International lawyer
container_volume 53
creator Huang, Robin Hui
Wang, Charles Chao
description In a two-tier partial bid, the acquirer may set different bid prices for the controlling shareholder and the minority shareholders.7 Minority shareholders usually lack information about the decisions of their peers and feel strongly coerced to sell their shares for fear of being locked in the target company.8 The accepting shareholders may be more successful than the rejecting shareholders, so it is imprudent for a shareholder to reject such a bid.9 Due to the difficulties of launching shareholder litigation in the U.K. and Australia, the U.S. fiduciary duty rules cannot be used to prevent the acquirers' exploitation.10 In 2006, China significantly reformed its corporate takeover law, permitting the use of a partial bid by an acquirer to discharge the MBR duty triggered by his crossing of the thirty percent shareholding threshold.11 This represents a profound deviation of the Chinese MBR from the U.K. MBR.12 On the other hand, the 2006 reform indicates a new trend that China's corporate takeover rules move towards the Japanese model of mandatory partial bids, which exists in China's neighboring Asian jurisdictions like Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea.13 When certain conditions are met, an acquirer in Japan is obligated to launch a partial bid to acquire the number of target shares which it plans to purchase in the first place.14 There are no extra financial burdens or risks of delisting associated with launching a general bid for all the remaining target shares beyond the purchase plan. [...]Hong Kong had the opportunity to persuade Chinese authorities to learn from Hong Kong securities law, including takeover rules. In the process of drafting its securities law, Chinese legislators also sought "suggestions and opinions" from Hong Kong experts.16 As a consequence, the influence of the Hong Kong takeover law on mainland China was so significant that the 1993 ITS, the first key regulation containing a takeover legal regime in China, faithfully transplanted the MBR from Hong Kong, which can in turn trace its origin to the U.K.17 The Chinese MBR, as stipulated under the 1993 ITS, bears close resemblance to its British counterpart: it requires an acquirer to launch a general bid, which means a full bid to all target shareholders for all remaining shares.18 Specifically, within forty-five working days of any legal person's direct or indirect acquiring of thirty percent of the target shares, such person should make a bid to buy all target shares.19 The Chinese MBR
format Article
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>gale_proqu</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2792093856</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><galeid>A655341944</galeid><informt_id>10.3316/agispt.20230821093530</informt_id><sourcerecordid>A655341944</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-g268t-73613dd7702d383d8acf4f11523f1cf5c17964014f0299cedad65052d85b0a893</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNptkcFq3DAQhk1JoZu07yDIoSeXkWTJUm7L0nYLgVzSSy9iIo29Sm3Llbwpffs4SUsJLHMY-Of7Zg7zptoIrm2tVWvOqg2AgLo1HN5V56XcA3CwWm2qH7cHYiNOAZeU_7C7GFg-DsSOU6DMdoc44cfCFvxJ6WENBvx9xbbMp3HGjEt8ILa6jMY55uhxYDPlMpN_mryv3nY4FPrwt19U3798vt3t6-ubr9922-u6F9osdSs1lyG0LYggjQwGfdd0nCshO-475XlrdQO86UBY6ylg0AqUCEbdARorL6rLl71zTr-OVBZ3n455Wk860VoBVhql_1M9DuTi1KUlox9j8W6rlZINt02zUvUJqqeJMg5poi6u8Sv-0wl-rUBj9CeF_YuQx7g47GOZF1cIsz88689xyr0LKToOTkqu_2EChAQj1s9JJUE-AtJWklk</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>2792093856</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>The mandatory bid rule under China's takeover law: A comparative and empirical perspective</title><source>HeinOnline Law Journal Library</source><source>Jstor Complete Legacy</source><creator>Huang, Robin Hui ; Wang, Charles Chao</creator><creatorcontrib>Huang, Robin Hui ; Wang, Charles Chao</creatorcontrib><description>In a two-tier partial bid, the acquirer may set different bid prices for the controlling shareholder and the minority shareholders.7 Minority shareholders usually lack information about the decisions of their peers and feel strongly coerced to sell their shares for fear of being locked in the target company.8 The accepting shareholders may be more successful than the rejecting shareholders, so it is imprudent for a shareholder to reject such a bid.9 Due to the difficulties of launching shareholder litigation in the U.K. and Australia, the U.S. fiduciary duty rules cannot be used to prevent the acquirers' exploitation.10 In 2006, China significantly reformed its corporate takeover law, permitting the use of a partial bid by an acquirer to discharge the MBR duty triggered by his crossing of the thirty percent shareholding threshold.11 This represents a profound deviation of the Chinese MBR from the U.K. MBR.12 On the other hand, the 2006 reform indicates a new trend that China's corporate takeover rules move towards the Japanese model of mandatory partial bids, which exists in China's neighboring Asian jurisdictions like Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea.13 When certain conditions are met, an acquirer in Japan is obligated to launch a partial bid to acquire the number of target shares which it plans to purchase in the first place.14 There are no extra financial burdens or risks of delisting associated with launching a general bid for all the remaining target shares beyond the purchase plan. [...]Hong Kong had the opportunity to persuade Chinese authorities to learn from Hong Kong securities law, including takeover rules. In the process of drafting its securities law, Chinese legislators also sought "suggestions and opinions" from Hong Kong experts.16 As a consequence, the influence of the Hong Kong takeover law on mainland China was so significant that the 1993 ITS, the first key regulation containing a takeover legal regime in China, faithfully transplanted the MBR from Hong Kong, which can in turn trace its origin to the U.K.17 The Chinese MBR, as stipulated under the 1993 ITS, bears close resemblance to its British counterpart: it requires an acquirer to launch a general bid, which means a full bid to all target shareholders for all remaining shares.18 Specifically, within forty-five working days of any legal person's direct or indirect acquiring of thirty percent of the target shares, such person should make a bid to buy all target shares.19 The Chinese MBR shareholding threshold was set at thirty percent, in line with the U.K. law.20 There were two price benchmarks: (1) "the highest price paid for the shares by any buyout within 12 months before the present buyout offer is made" (pre-bid price); and (2) "the average market price of such shares within 30 days before the buyout offer is made" (prevailing market price).21 This provision was deemed a carbon copy of the Hong Kong Code of Takeovers and Mergers and Repurchases.22 A takeover attempt will be treated as a failure when the acquirer only manages to hold less than 50 percent of the common shares of the target listed company upon the expiry of the offering period. The acquirer makes purchasing requests to the controlling shareholder, the actual controller or specific shareholders with a large shareholding, and reaches a takeover agreement.28 This was considered a glaring loophole, given that, in reality, negotiated takeovers have been the main type of takeovers in China due to various reasons such as concentrated share ownership.29 In 2002, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), which is mandated to regulate the Chinese securities market including the takeover matter, issued the Measures for Regulating Takeovers of Listed Companies (Takeover Measures), providing more practical guidance on the workings of the takeover regulation in China.30 Under the 2002 Takeover Measures, it is clearly stated that the triggering event may be a takeover via exchange or a negotiated takeover.31 The requirement for a full or general bid under the MBR remains unchanged.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0020-7810</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 2169-6578</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Chicago: American Bar Association</publisher><subject>Acquisitions &amp; mergers ; Acquisitions and mergers ; Bids ; Comparative analysis ; Comparative law ; Law and legislation ; Laws, regulations and rules ; Letting of contracts ; Market prices ; New stock market listings ; Regulation ; Securities industry ; Securities markets ; Stock exchanges ; Stockholders ; Tender offers</subject><ispartof>The International lawyer, 2020-06, Vol.53 (2), p.195-233</ispartof><rights>COPYRIGHT 2020 American Bar Association</rights><rights>Copyright American Bar Association 2020</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>314,776,780</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Huang, Robin Hui</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Wang, Charles Chao</creatorcontrib><title>The mandatory bid rule under China's takeover law: A comparative and empirical perspective</title><title>The International lawyer</title><description>In a two-tier partial bid, the acquirer may set different bid prices for the controlling shareholder and the minority shareholders.7 Minority shareholders usually lack information about the decisions of their peers and feel strongly coerced to sell their shares for fear of being locked in the target company.8 The accepting shareholders may be more successful than the rejecting shareholders, so it is imprudent for a shareholder to reject such a bid.9 Due to the difficulties of launching shareholder litigation in the U.K. and Australia, the U.S. fiduciary duty rules cannot be used to prevent the acquirers' exploitation.10 In 2006, China significantly reformed its corporate takeover law, permitting the use of a partial bid by an acquirer to discharge the MBR duty triggered by his crossing of the thirty percent shareholding threshold.11 This represents a profound deviation of the Chinese MBR from the U.K. MBR.12 On the other hand, the 2006 reform indicates a new trend that China's corporate takeover rules move towards the Japanese model of mandatory partial bids, which exists in China's neighboring Asian jurisdictions like Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea.13 When certain conditions are met, an acquirer in Japan is obligated to launch a partial bid to acquire the number of target shares which it plans to purchase in the first place.14 There are no extra financial burdens or risks of delisting associated with launching a general bid for all the remaining target shares beyond the purchase plan. [...]Hong Kong had the opportunity to persuade Chinese authorities to learn from Hong Kong securities law, including takeover rules. In the process of drafting its securities law, Chinese legislators also sought "suggestions and opinions" from Hong Kong experts.16 As a consequence, the influence of the Hong Kong takeover law on mainland China was so significant that the 1993 ITS, the first key regulation containing a takeover legal regime in China, faithfully transplanted the MBR from Hong Kong, which can in turn trace its origin to the U.K.17 The Chinese MBR, as stipulated under the 1993 ITS, bears close resemblance to its British counterpart: it requires an acquirer to launch a general bid, which means a full bid to all target shareholders for all remaining shares.18 Specifically, within forty-five working days of any legal person's direct or indirect acquiring of thirty percent of the target shares, such person should make a bid to buy all target shares.19 The Chinese MBR shareholding threshold was set at thirty percent, in line with the U.K. law.20 There were two price benchmarks: (1) "the highest price paid for the shares by any buyout within 12 months before the present buyout offer is made" (pre-bid price); and (2) "the average market price of such shares within 30 days before the buyout offer is made" (prevailing market price).21 This provision was deemed a carbon copy of the Hong Kong Code of Takeovers and Mergers and Repurchases.22 A takeover attempt will be treated as a failure when the acquirer only manages to hold less than 50 percent of the common shares of the target listed company upon the expiry of the offering period. The acquirer makes purchasing requests to the controlling shareholder, the actual controller or specific shareholders with a large shareholding, and reaches a takeover agreement.28 This was considered a glaring loophole, given that, in reality, negotiated takeovers have been the main type of takeovers in China due to various reasons such as concentrated share ownership.29 In 2002, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), which is mandated to regulate the Chinese securities market including the takeover matter, issued the Measures for Regulating Takeovers of Listed Companies (Takeover Measures), providing more practical guidance on the workings of the takeover regulation in China.30 Under the 2002 Takeover Measures, it is clearly stated that the triggering event may be a takeover via exchange or a negotiated takeover.31 The requirement for a full or general bid under the MBR remains unchanged.</description><subject>Acquisitions &amp; mergers</subject><subject>Acquisitions and mergers</subject><subject>Bids</subject><subject>Comparative analysis</subject><subject>Comparative law</subject><subject>Law and legislation</subject><subject>Laws, regulations and rules</subject><subject>Letting of contracts</subject><subject>Market prices</subject><subject>New stock market listings</subject><subject>Regulation</subject><subject>Securities industry</subject><subject>Securities markets</subject><subject>Stock exchanges</subject><subject>Stockholders</subject><subject>Tender offers</subject><issn>0020-7810</issn><issn>2169-6578</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2020</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>8G5</sourceid><sourceid>ABUWG</sourceid><sourceid>AFKRA</sourceid><sourceid>AZQEC</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>CCPQU</sourceid><sourceid>DWQXO</sourceid><sourceid>GNUQQ</sourceid><sourceid>GUQSH</sourceid><sourceid>M2O</sourceid><recordid>eNptkcFq3DAQhk1JoZu07yDIoSeXkWTJUm7L0nYLgVzSSy9iIo29Sm3Llbwpffs4SUsJLHMY-Of7Zg7zptoIrm2tVWvOqg2AgLo1HN5V56XcA3CwWm2qH7cHYiNOAZeU_7C7GFg-DsSOU6DMdoc44cfCFvxJ6WENBvx9xbbMp3HGjEt8ILa6jMY55uhxYDPlMpN_mryv3nY4FPrwt19U3798vt3t6-ubr9922-u6F9osdSs1lyG0LYggjQwGfdd0nCshO-475XlrdQO86UBY6ylg0AqUCEbdARorL6rLl71zTr-OVBZ3n455Wk860VoBVhql_1M9DuTi1KUlox9j8W6rlZINt02zUvUJqqeJMg5poi6u8Sv-0wl-rUBj9CeF_YuQx7g47GOZF1cIsz88689xyr0LKToOTkqu_2EChAQj1s9JJUE-AtJWklk</recordid><startdate>20200622</startdate><enddate>20200622</enddate><creator>Huang, Robin Hui</creator><creator>Wang, Charles Chao</creator><general>American Bar Association</general><scope>ILT</scope><scope>3V.</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>8FK</scope><scope>8G5</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>GNUQQ</scope><scope>GUQSH</scope><scope>M2O</scope><scope>MBDVC</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>Q9U</scope><scope>S0X</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20200622</creationdate><title>The mandatory bid rule under China's takeover law: A comparative and empirical perspective</title><author>Huang, Robin Hui ; Wang, Charles Chao</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-g268t-73613dd7702d383d8acf4f11523f1cf5c17964014f0299cedad65052d85b0a893</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2020</creationdate><topic>Acquisitions &amp; mergers</topic><topic>Acquisitions and mergers</topic><topic>Bids</topic><topic>Comparative analysis</topic><topic>Comparative law</topic><topic>Law and legislation</topic><topic>Laws, regulations and rules</topic><topic>Letting of contracts</topic><topic>Market prices</topic><topic>New stock market listings</topic><topic>Regulation</topic><topic>Securities industry</topic><topic>Securities markets</topic><topic>Stock exchanges</topic><topic>Stockholders</topic><topic>Tender offers</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Huang, Robin Hui</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Wang, Charles Chao</creatorcontrib><collection>Gale OneFile: LegalTrac</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Corporate)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni) (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>Research Library (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central UK/Ireland</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Essentials</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Korea</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Student</collection><collection>Research Library Prep</collection><collection>Research Library</collection><collection>Research Library (Corporate)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Basic</collection><collection>SIRS Editorial</collection><jtitle>The International lawyer</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Huang, Robin Hui</au><au>Wang, Charles Chao</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>The mandatory bid rule under China's takeover law: A comparative and empirical perspective</atitle><jtitle>The International lawyer</jtitle><date>2020-06-22</date><risdate>2020</risdate><volume>53</volume><issue>2</issue><spage>195</spage><epage>233</epage><pages>195-233</pages><issn>0020-7810</issn><eissn>2169-6578</eissn><abstract>In a two-tier partial bid, the acquirer may set different bid prices for the controlling shareholder and the minority shareholders.7 Minority shareholders usually lack information about the decisions of their peers and feel strongly coerced to sell their shares for fear of being locked in the target company.8 The accepting shareholders may be more successful than the rejecting shareholders, so it is imprudent for a shareholder to reject such a bid.9 Due to the difficulties of launching shareholder litigation in the U.K. and Australia, the U.S. fiduciary duty rules cannot be used to prevent the acquirers' exploitation.10 In 2006, China significantly reformed its corporate takeover law, permitting the use of a partial bid by an acquirer to discharge the MBR duty triggered by his crossing of the thirty percent shareholding threshold.11 This represents a profound deviation of the Chinese MBR from the U.K. MBR.12 On the other hand, the 2006 reform indicates a new trend that China's corporate takeover rules move towards the Japanese model of mandatory partial bids, which exists in China's neighboring Asian jurisdictions like Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea.13 When certain conditions are met, an acquirer in Japan is obligated to launch a partial bid to acquire the number of target shares which it plans to purchase in the first place.14 There are no extra financial burdens or risks of delisting associated with launching a general bid for all the remaining target shares beyond the purchase plan. [...]Hong Kong had the opportunity to persuade Chinese authorities to learn from Hong Kong securities law, including takeover rules. In the process of drafting its securities law, Chinese legislators also sought "suggestions and opinions" from Hong Kong experts.16 As a consequence, the influence of the Hong Kong takeover law on mainland China was so significant that the 1993 ITS, the first key regulation containing a takeover legal regime in China, faithfully transplanted the MBR from Hong Kong, which can in turn trace its origin to the U.K.17 The Chinese MBR, as stipulated under the 1993 ITS, bears close resemblance to its British counterpart: it requires an acquirer to launch a general bid, which means a full bid to all target shareholders for all remaining shares.18 Specifically, within forty-five working days of any legal person's direct or indirect acquiring of thirty percent of the target shares, such person should make a bid to buy all target shares.19 The Chinese MBR shareholding threshold was set at thirty percent, in line with the U.K. law.20 There were two price benchmarks: (1) "the highest price paid for the shares by any buyout within 12 months before the present buyout offer is made" (pre-bid price); and (2) "the average market price of such shares within 30 days before the buyout offer is made" (prevailing market price).21 This provision was deemed a carbon copy of the Hong Kong Code of Takeovers and Mergers and Repurchases.22 A takeover attempt will be treated as a failure when the acquirer only manages to hold less than 50 percent of the common shares of the target listed company upon the expiry of the offering period. The acquirer makes purchasing requests to the controlling shareholder, the actual controller or specific shareholders with a large shareholding, and reaches a takeover agreement.28 This was considered a glaring loophole, given that, in reality, negotiated takeovers have been the main type of takeovers in China due to various reasons such as concentrated share ownership.29 In 2002, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), which is mandated to regulate the Chinese securities market including the takeover matter, issued the Measures for Regulating Takeovers of Listed Companies (Takeover Measures), providing more practical guidance on the workings of the takeover regulation in China.30 Under the 2002 Takeover Measures, it is clearly stated that the triggering event may be a takeover via exchange or a negotiated takeover.31 The requirement for a full or general bid under the MBR remains unchanged.</abstract><cop>Chicago</cop><pub>American Bar Association</pub><tpages>39</tpages></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext
identifier ISSN: 0020-7810
ispartof The International lawyer, 2020-06, Vol.53 (2), p.195-233
issn 0020-7810
2169-6578
language eng
recordid cdi_proquest_journals_2792093856
source HeinOnline Law Journal Library; Jstor Complete Legacy
subjects Acquisitions & mergers
Acquisitions and mergers
Bids
Comparative analysis
Comparative law
Law and legislation
Laws, regulations and rules
Letting of contracts
Market prices
New stock market listings
Regulation
Securities industry
Securities markets
Stock exchanges
Stockholders
Tender offers
title The mandatory bid rule under China's takeover law: A comparative and empirical perspective
url https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-24T15%3A10%3A26IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-gale_proqu&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=The%20mandatory%20bid%20rule%20under%20China's%20takeover%20law:%20A%20comparative%20and%20empirical%20perspective&rft.jtitle=The%20International%20lawyer&rft.au=Huang,%20Robin%20Hui&rft.date=2020-06-22&rft.volume=53&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=195&rft.epage=233&rft.pages=195-233&rft.issn=0020-7810&rft.eissn=2169-6578&rft_id=info:doi/&rft_dat=%3Cgale_proqu%3EA655341944%3C/gale_proqu%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=2792093856&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_galeid=A655341944&rft_informt_id=10.3316/agispt.20230821093530&rfr_iscdi=true