State of the Fiscal Contract in Lagos’ Informal Settlements

Governments often have contentious relationships with residents of urban informal settlements. Motivated by the desire for rents and dreams of becoming the next luxury destination, city governments worldwide have forcefully evicted and demolished informal communities in this pursuit. In such instanc...

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Veröffentlicht in:Studies in comparative international development 2023-03, Vol.58 (1), p.1-28
Hauptverfasser: Rosenzweig, Leah R., Wilson, Nicole E.
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description Governments often have contentious relationships with residents of urban informal settlements. Motivated by the desire for rents and dreams of becoming the next luxury destination, city governments worldwide have forcefully evicted and demolished informal communities in this pursuit. In such instances it would seem that the state has broken the social contract with its most vulnerable citizens. How do citizens respond? We might expect them to reciprocate in kind, by withholding taxes owed to the government. Using a survey of citizens living in informal settlements across Lagos State in Nigeria, we explore what predicts citizens’ willingness to comply with government taxation. In this unlikely context for voluntary compliance, we observe that a third of respondents pay taxes and a majority are willing to pay absent enforcement. We find minimal support for standard theories of tax payment — trust in or reciprocity toward the government, or identification with the nation. Instead, we find that willingness to pay taxes is correlated with group membership, believing that community members respect taxpayers, and donating to the community. Our data suggest that local institutions and social relations are associated with citizens’ willingness to comply with tax policy.
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Motivated by the desire for rents and dreams of becoming the next luxury destination, city governments worldwide have forcefully evicted and demolished informal communities in this pursuit. In such instances it would seem that the state has broken the social contract with its most vulnerable citizens. How do citizens respond? We might expect them to reciprocate in kind, by withholding taxes owed to the government. Using a survey of citizens living in informal settlements across Lagos State in Nigeria, we explore what predicts citizens’ willingness to comply with government taxation. In this unlikely context for voluntary compliance, we observe that a third of respondents pay taxes and a majority are willing to pay absent enforcement. We find minimal support for standard theories of tax payment — trust in or reciprocity toward the government, or identification with the nation. 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source Applied Social Sciences Index & Abstracts (ASSIA); Springer Nature - Complete Springer Journals; PAIS Index; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Political Science Complete (EBSCOhost); EBSCOhost Business Source Complete
subjects Attitudes
Bevölkerungsverhalten
Cities
Citizens
Community
Community relations
Compliance
Cooperation
Dreams
Enforcement
Fiscal policy
Informell
Local government
Membership
Motivation
Nigeria
Reciprocity
Rents
Residents
Respondents
Siedlung
Slum
Social aspects
Social contract
Social relations
Social Sciences
Stadt
Stadtbevölkerung
State budgets
Steuern
Surveys
Taxation
Taxes
Willingness to pay
title State of the Fiscal Contract in Lagos’ Informal Settlements
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