Agile contracting: Managing incentives under uncertain needs

We consider a novel principal–agent model that captures some salient features of an agile software development project. Specifically, the project is technically complex, can be modularized via a set of independent stories which are developed in sprints, and has requirements that can change over time...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben

Veröffentlicht in:	Production and operations management 2023-03, Vol.32 (3), p.972-988
Hauptverfasser:	Gupta, Shivam, Agrawal, Anupam, Ryan, Jennifer K.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	agile software development learning effects optimal contract Software development unobservable effort
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
Tags:	Tag hinzufügen Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!