Wittgenstein on logical truth and bipolarity

Wittgenstein on logical truth and bipolarity

I provide a motivation for Wittgenstein's holding to the view that a necessary condition of an item's possessing a sense is its being capable of truth and capable of falsehood. I argue that Wittgenstein adopted the relevant view in order to defend an approach to the determination of logica...

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Veröffentlicht in:Philosophical investigations 2023-04, Vol.46 (2), p.180-195
1. Verfasser: Spinney, Oliver Thomas
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Sprache:eng
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Philosophy
Russell, Bertrand Arthur William (1872-1970)
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1889-1951)
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description I provide a motivation for Wittgenstein's holding to the view that a necessary condition of an item's possessing a sense is its being capable of truth and capable of falsehood. I argue that Wittgenstein adopted the relevant view in order to defend an approach to the determination of logical truth on which the subject matter of a proposition is irrelevant to our making such a determination. This approach was itself conceived of as a remedy to that employed by Russell, and to a conception of logical truth on which the axiom of reducibility counts as logically true.
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subjects Philosophy
Russell, Bertrand Arthur William (1872-1970)
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1889-1951)
title Wittgenstein on logical truth and bipolarity
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