Employee bonding and turnover efficiency

This study explores how bonding contracts improve employee attraction and retention. These bonds are payment schemes tied to employment duration, such as the vesting of pensions and stock options. This study presents an employee turnover model in which only the worker knows their taste for their cur...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of economics & management strategy 2023, Vol.32 (1), p.223-244
1. Verfasser:	Peterson, Jonathan R.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Arbeitsmobilität Employee turnover Employment Mitarbeiterbindung Monopson Pensions Personalmanagement Vergütungssystem
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creator	Peterson, Jonathan R.
description	This study explores how bonding contracts improve employee attraction and retention. These bonds are payment schemes tied to employment duration, such as the vesting of pensions and stock options. This study presents an employee turnover model in which only the worker knows their taste for their current job. This taste gives the current employer monopsonistic power, resulting in deadweight loss from excessive turnover. Bonding contracts serve as a commitment device for future wages and eliminate such deadweight loss, but only when the roles of bondholders and wage setters are separate. Firms that do this are more competitive to new hires. This model offers several empirical findings regarding a variety of common bonding practices.
doi_str_mv	10.1111/jems.12499
format	Article
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source	Wiley Online Library Journals Frontfile Complete; Business Source Complete
subjects	Arbeitsmobilität Employee turnover Employment Mitarbeiterbindung Monopson Pensions Personalmanagement Vergütungssystem
title	Employee bonding and turnover efficiency
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