Incentives and Strategic Behavior of Professional Boxers
In professional boxing, a higher-ranked boxer chooses his opponent among challengers varying in popularity and strength. We build a three-stage model of a professional boxing fight between the chooser and a challenger to examine the strategic incentives of a chooser in sharing the purse and exerting...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of sports economics 2023-01, Vol.24 (1), p.28-49 |
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| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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