Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm

We formally assume that players in a game consider Nash Equilibrium (NE) the behavioral norm. In finite games of perfect information this leads to a refinement of NE: Faithful Nash Equilibrium (FNE). FNE is outcome equivalent to NE of the “trimmed” game, obtained by restricting the original tree to...

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Veröffentlicht in:	International journal of game theory 2022-11, Vol.51 (3-4), p.589-605
Hauptverfasser:	Forges, Françoise, Sákovics, József
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Behavioral/Experimental Economics Decision making Decision theory Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Equilibrium Equilibrium analysis Game Theory Games Hypotheses Induction Operations Research/Decision Theory Original Paper Perfectionism Social and Behav. Sciences Threat evaluation Threats Uniqueness
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