Formalizing the presumption of independence
Mathematical proof aims to deliver confident conclusions, but a very similar process of deduction can be used to make uncertain estimates that are open to revision. A key ingredient in such reasoning is the use of a "default" estimate of \(\mathbb{E}[XY] = \mathbb{E}[X] \mathbb{E}[Y]\) in...
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Veröffentlicht in: | arXiv.org 2022-11 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Zusammenfassung: | Mathematical proof aims to deliver confident conclusions, but a very similar process of deduction can be used to make uncertain estimates that are open to revision. A key ingredient in such reasoning is the use of a "default" estimate of \(\mathbb{E}[XY] = \mathbb{E}[X] \mathbb{E}[Y]\) in the absence of any specific information about the correlation between \(X\) and \(Y\), which we call *the presumption of independence*. Reasoning based on this heuristic is commonplace, intuitively compelling, and often quite successful -- but completely informal. In this paper we introduce the concept of a heuristic estimator as a potential formalization of this type of defeasible reasoning. We introduce a set of intuitively desirable coherence properties for heuristic estimators that are not satisfied by any existing candidates. Then we present our main open problem: is there a heuristic estimator that formalizes intuitively valid applications of the presumption of independence without also accepting spurious arguments? |
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ISSN: | 2331-8422 |