Against and For Ethical Naturalism: Or: How Not To “Naturalize” Ethics

Moral realism and ethical naturalism are both highly attractive ethical positions but historically they have often been thought to be irreconcilable. Since the late 1980s defenders of Cornell Realism have argued that the two positions can consistently be combined. They make three constitutive claims...

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Veröffentlicht in:	American philosophical quarterly (Oxford) 2022-10, Vol.59 (4), p.327-352
Hauptverfasser:	Brogaard, Berit, Slote, Michael
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Causality Ethics Feasibility Inconsistency Morality Naturalism Philosophy Realism
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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