Risk and rationality: The relative importance of probability weighting and choice set dependence

The literature suggests that probability weighting and choice set dependence influence risky choices. However, their relative importance remains an open question. We present a joint test that uses binary choices between lotteries provoking Common Consequence and Common Ratio Allais Paradoxes and manipulates their joint payoff distribution. We show non-parametrically that probability weighting and choice set dependence both play a role at describing aggregate choices. To parsimoniously account for heterogeneity, we also estimate a structural model using a finite mixture approach. The model uncovers substantial heterogeneity and classifies subjects into three types: 38% Prospect Theory types whose choices are predominantly driven by probability weighting, 34% Salience Theory types whose choices are predominantly driven by choice set dependence, and 28% Expected Utility Theory types. The model predicts type-specific differences in the frequency of preference reversals out-of-sample, i.e., in choices with a different context than the ones used for estimating the model. Moreover, the out-of-sample predictions indicate that the choice context shapes the influence of choice set dependence.