Cheating under Regulation: Evidence from “Yin-and-Yang” Contracts on Beijing’s Housing Market
This paper reveals the role of Yin-and-Yang contracts in evading transaction regulations in China’s housing market. Using micro-observations of Beijing’s housing resales, we find buyers are engaged in “Yin-and-Yang” contracts with higher degree of under-reporting during “the most stringent regulatio...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Sustainability 2022-10, Vol.14 (20), p.13346 |
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| creator | Dai, Yanke Xu, Yangfei |
| description | This paper reveals the role of Yin-and-Yang contracts in evading transaction regulations in China’s housing market. Using micro-observations of Beijing’s housing resales, we find buyers are engaged in “Yin-and-Yang” contracts with higher degree of under-reporting during “the most stringent regulation in history”. We then estimate the extra tax loss from this further under-reporting as an unexpected side effect of regulation policies. Moreover, since “Yin-and-Yang” contracts put more liquidity pressure on the buyers, we also investigate the potential crowding-out effect and enlarged inequality after regulation. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.3390/su142013346 |
| format | Article |
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| subjects | Cheating China Contracts Coronaviruses COVID-19 Dwellings Economic aspects Economic development Evaluation Households Housing Housing prices Inequality Laws, regulations and rules Liquidity Pandemics Real estate industry Regulation Wage & price controls |
| title | Cheating under Regulation: Evidence from “Yin-and-Yang” Contracts on Beijing’s Housing Market |
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