Protecting Sticky Consumers in Essential Markets
This paper studies regulatory policy interventions that are aimed at protecting sticky consumers who are exposed to the risk of being taken advantage of. We model heterogeneous consumer switching costs alongside asymmetric market shares. This setting encompasses many markets in which established fir...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Review of industrial organization 2022-11, Vol.61 (3), p.247-278 |
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| creator | Beckert, Walter Siciliani, Paolo |
| description | This paper studies regulatory policy interventions that are aimed at protecting sticky consumers who are exposed to the risk of being taken advantage of. We model heterogeneous consumer switching costs alongside asymmetric market shares. This setting encompasses many markets in which established firms are challenged by new entrants. We identify circumstances under which such interventions can be counterproductive: with regard to the stated consumer protection objective and also with regard to the complementary aim to promote competition. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s11151-022-09880-z |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0889-938X |
| ispartof | Review of industrial organization, 2022-11, Vol.61 (3), p.247-278 |
| issn | 0889-938X 1573-7160 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_2726685914 |
| source | PAIS Index; SpringerNature Journals; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete |
| subjects | Competition Consumer protection Consumers Cost control Customers Economics Economics and Finance Industrial Organization Intervention Market shares Microeconomics Regulation |
| title | Protecting Sticky Consumers in Essential Markets |
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