Research on Evolutionary Game Strategy Selection and Simulation Research of Carbon Emission Reduction of Government and Enterprises under the “Dual Carbon” Goal

As one of the effective market instruments in carbon emission reduction policy, carbon trading is capable of promoting the smooth implementation of the “dual carbon” goal. Based on the path evolutionary game method of information economics, this paper constructs a dynamic game model of the evolution...

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Veröffentlicht in:Sustainability 2022-10, Vol.14 (19), p.12647
Hauptverfasser: Li, Sufeng, Dong, Chenxin, Yang, Lei, Gao, Xinpeng, Wei, Wei, Zhao, Ming, Xia, Weiqi
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container_issue 19
container_start_page 12647
container_title Sustainability
container_volume 14
creator Li, Sufeng
Dong, Chenxin
Yang, Lei
Gao, Xinpeng
Wei, Wei
Zhao, Ming
Xia, Weiqi
description As one of the effective market instruments in carbon emission reduction policy, carbon trading is capable of promoting the smooth implementation of the “dual carbon” goal. Based on the path evolutionary game method of information economics, this paper constructs a dynamic game model of the evolution and development of government and enterprise carbon emission reduction. It also analyzes the evolution and development law of government and enterprise carbon emission reduction. We used the carbon market trading data of Guangdong Province to simulate the evolutionary game path of government and enterprise carbon emission reduction under the “double carbon” target and then selected strategies. Results show that (1) Scientific adjustment of carbon quota can effectively shorten the realization time of carbon emission reduction probability of high-pollution enterprises, obtain additional surplus carbon quota, and win extra carbon emission reduction income; (2) Increasing financial subsidies can improve the probability of carbon emission reduction of high-pollution enterprises but cannot prevent the periodic change in carbon emission reduction probability, which in turn helps prolong the “window period” of government regulation on carbon emission reduction; (3) Increasing carbon emission penalties will help high-pollution enterprises actively reduce emissions and improve the motivation of government supervision; (4) The government can introduce a dynamic reward and punishment mechanism. If the government properly chooses the reward and punishment strategy, it may not necessarily pay additional subsidies, so that the government and enterprises can cooperate in tacit agreement to achieve the goal of carbon emission reduction; (5) If the price of carbon emission permits is adjusted, high-pollution enterprises will actively reduce carbon emissions and gain greater benefits no matter what regulatory measures the government takes. Results of this study have profound significance for carbon emission reduction strategies and government regulation of high-pollution enterprises and will help China achieve its “dual carbon” development goal.
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Based on the path evolutionary game method of information economics, this paper constructs a dynamic game model of the evolution and development of government and enterprise carbon emission reduction. It also analyzes the evolution and development law of government and enterprise carbon emission reduction. We used the carbon market trading data of Guangdong Province to simulate the evolutionary game path of government and enterprise carbon emission reduction under the “double carbon” target and then selected strategies. Results show that (1) Scientific adjustment of carbon quota can effectively shorten the realization time of carbon emission reduction probability of high-pollution enterprises, obtain additional surplus carbon quota, and win extra carbon emission reduction income; (2) Increasing financial subsidies can improve the probability of carbon emission reduction of high-pollution enterprises but cannot prevent the periodic change in carbon emission reduction probability, which in turn helps prolong the “window period” of government regulation on carbon emission reduction; (3) Increasing carbon emission penalties will help high-pollution enterprises actively reduce emissions and improve the motivation of government supervision; (4) The government can introduce a dynamic reward and punishment mechanism. If the government properly chooses the reward and punishment strategy, it may not necessarily pay additional subsidies, so that the government and enterprises can cooperate in tacit agreement to achieve the goal of carbon emission reduction; (5) If the price of carbon emission permits is adjusted, high-pollution enterprises will actively reduce carbon emissions and gain greater benefits no matter what regulatory measures the government takes. 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subjects Aluminum
Business enterprises
Carbon dioxide
Control
Emission analysis
Emissions
Emissions control
Emissions trading
Energy industry
Environmental aspects
Evolution
Externality
Game theory
Government regulations
Growth rate
Motivation
Pollution
Punishment
Reinforcement
Strategy
Subsidies
Supervision
Sustainability
title Research on Evolutionary Game Strategy Selection and Simulation Research of Carbon Emission Reduction of Government and Enterprises under the “Dual Carbon” Goal
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