Optimal social distancing and the economics of uncertain vaccine arrival

Optimal social distancing and the economics of uncertain vaccine arrival

We analytically identify two mechanisms that explain why a later arrival time for a pandemic‐ending vaccine has an ambiguous effect on optimal social‐distancing policy. We assess the net effect of these channels using a quantitative model solved for over a thousand parameter combinations. Optimal po...

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of public economic theory 2022-10, Vol.24 (5), p.1071-1100
Hauptverfasser: Iverson, Terrence, Karp, Larry, Peri, Alessandro
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Arzneimittel
Economic theory
Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit
Impfung
Infektionsschutz
Theorie
Zeitökonomie
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creator Iverson, Terrence
Karp, Larry
Peri, Alessandro
description We analytically identify two mechanisms that explain why a later arrival time for a pandemic‐ending vaccine has an ambiguous effect on optimal social‐distancing policy. We assess the net effect of these channels using a quantitative model solved for over a thousand parameter combinations. Optimal policy and welfare comparisons are both highly sensitive to beliefs about vaccine arrival. A policy of moving quickly to herd immunity by requiring social distancing for only the most vulnerable might be loosely justified for expected vaccine arrivals over 2 years, but becomes catastrophic if the expected arrival is within a year.
doi_str_mv 10.1111/jpet.12606
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source Wiley Online Library Journals Frontfile Complete; Business Source Complete
subjects Arzneimittel
Economic theory
Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit
Impfung
Infektionsschutz
Theorie
Zeitökonomie
title Optimal social distancing and the economics of uncertain vaccine arrival
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