Optimal emission taxation and the Porter hypothesis under Bertrand competition
ABSTRACT Is socially efficient taxation conducive to the win‐win solution associated with the strong version of the Porter Hypothesis? Using a Bertrand duopoly yielding a continuum of Nash equilibria, we show that this is true for almost any level of environmental damage and equilibrium pricing stra...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Annals of public and cooperative economics 2022-09, Vol.93 (3), p.755-765 |
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| container_end_page | 765 |
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| container_issue | 3 |
| container_start_page | 755 |
| container_title | Annals of public and cooperative economics |
| container_volume | 93 |
| creator | Delbono, Flavio Lambertini, Luca |
| description | ABSTRACT
Is socially efficient taxation conducive to the win‐win solution associated with the strong version of the Porter Hypothesis? Using a Bertrand duopoly yielding a continuum of Nash equilibria, we show that this is true for almost any level of environmental damage and equilibrium pricing strategy. We also prove that the only case in which no conflict arises between private and public incentives is where firms price at marginal cost. This finding suggests that coordination between environmental and competition authorities would be highly desirable. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/apce.12338 |
| format | Article |
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Is socially efficient taxation conducive to the win‐win solution associated with the strong version of the Porter Hypothesis? Using a Bertrand duopoly yielding a continuum of Nash equilibria, we show that this is true for almost any level of environmental damage and equilibrium pricing strategy. We also prove that the only case in which no conflict arises between private and public incentives is where firms price at marginal cost. This finding suggests that coordination between environmental and competition authorities would be highly desirable.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1370-4788</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1467-8292</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1111/apce.12338</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher><subject>Coordination ; Duopoly ; emission taxation ; green innovation ; Porter hypothesis ; price competition ; Taxation ; win‐win solution</subject><ispartof>Annals of public and cooperative economics, 2022-09, Vol.93 (3), p.755-765</ispartof><rights>2021 Edgard Milhaud Foundation.</rights><rights>Journal compilation © 2022 EMF.</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c4288-1b40e4762a9c3ab539e21bd43f109f1bf228117c4518393eae237c27d611fc443</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c4288-1b40e4762a9c3ab539e21bd43f109f1bf228117c4518393eae237c27d611fc443</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111%2Fapce.12338$$EPDF$$P50$$Gwiley$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111%2Fapce.12338$$EHTML$$P50$$Gwiley$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,1417,27924,27925,45574,45575</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Delbono, Flavio</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Lambertini, Luca</creatorcontrib><title>Optimal emission taxation and the Porter hypothesis under Bertrand competition</title><title>Annals of public and cooperative economics</title><description>ABSTRACT
Is socially efficient taxation conducive to the win‐win solution associated with the strong version of the Porter Hypothesis? Using a Bertrand duopoly yielding a continuum of Nash equilibria, we show that this is true for almost any level of environmental damage and equilibrium pricing strategy. We also prove that the only case in which no conflict arises between private and public incentives is where firms price at marginal cost. This finding suggests that coordination between environmental and competition authorities would be highly desirable.</description><subject>Coordination</subject><subject>Duopoly</subject><subject>emission taxation</subject><subject>green innovation</subject><subject>Porter hypothesis</subject><subject>price competition</subject><subject>Taxation</subject><subject>win‐win solution</subject><issn>1370-4788</issn><issn>1467-8292</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2022</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNp9kE1LAzEQhoMoWKsXf8GCN2FrJkk32WMt9QPE9qDnkE1n6ZZ2syYp2n9v1hW8OZf54Jl3mJeQa6ATSHFnOosTYJyrEzICUchcsZKdpppLmgup1Dm5CGFLKcjUjcjrsovN3uwy3DchNK7NovkysS9Mu87iBrOV8xF9tjl2LrWhCdmhXafBPfroe8i6fYex6ZcuyVltdgGvfvOYvD8s3uZP-cvy8Xk-e8mtYErlUAmKQhbMlJabaspLZFCtBa-BljVUNWMKQFoxBcVLjgYZl5bJdQFQWyH4mNwMup13HwcMUW_dwbfppGZFqcS0EFQl6nagrHcheKx159Oz_qiB6t4v3fulf_xKcDbAaF3bhD9UsUKVFBhLCAzIZ7PD4z9ieraaLwbZbzQQd1Y</recordid><startdate>202209</startdate><enddate>202209</enddate><creator>Delbono, Flavio</creator><creator>Lambertini, Luca</creator><general>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</general><scope>OQ6</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>202209</creationdate><title>Optimal emission taxation and the Porter hypothesis under Bertrand competition</title><author>Delbono, Flavio ; Lambertini, Luca</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c4288-1b40e4762a9c3ab539e21bd43f109f1bf228117c4518393eae237c27d611fc443</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2022</creationdate><topic>Coordination</topic><topic>Duopoly</topic><topic>emission taxation</topic><topic>green innovation</topic><topic>Porter hypothesis</topic><topic>price competition</topic><topic>Taxation</topic><topic>win‐win solution</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Delbono, Flavio</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Lambertini, Luca</creatorcontrib><collection>ECONIS</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Annals of public and cooperative economics</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Delbono, Flavio</au><au>Lambertini, Luca</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Optimal emission taxation and the Porter hypothesis under Bertrand competition</atitle><jtitle>Annals of public and cooperative economics</jtitle><date>2022-09</date><risdate>2022</risdate><volume>93</volume><issue>3</issue><spage>755</spage><epage>765</epage><pages>755-765</pages><issn>1370-4788</issn><eissn>1467-8292</eissn><abstract>ABSTRACT
Is socially efficient taxation conducive to the win‐win solution associated with the strong version of the Porter Hypothesis? Using a Bertrand duopoly yielding a continuum of Nash equilibria, we show that this is true for almost any level of environmental damage and equilibrium pricing strategy. We also prove that the only case in which no conflict arises between private and public incentives is where firms price at marginal cost. This finding suggests that coordination between environmental and competition authorities would be highly desirable.</abstract><cop>Oxford</cop><pub>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</pub><doi>10.1111/apce.12338</doi><tpages>11</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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| identifier | ISSN: 1370-4788 |
| ispartof | Annals of public and cooperative economics, 2022-09, Vol.93 (3), p.755-765 |
| issn | 1370-4788 1467-8292 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_2698456408 |
| source | Wiley Journals; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete |
| subjects | Coordination Duopoly emission taxation green innovation Porter hypothesis price competition Taxation win‐win solution |
| title | Optimal emission taxation and the Porter hypothesis under Bertrand competition |
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