Governing through non‐enforcement: Regulatory forbearance as industrial policy in advanced economies

Political economy scholarship generally assumes that governments are interested in enforcing economic regulations. Cases of non-enforcement are predominantly studied in the context of developing countries and are chiefly associated with states' deficient institutional capacity. This article cas...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Regulation & governance 2022-07, Vol.16 (3), p.930-950
Hauptverfasser:	Dewey, Matías, Di Carlo, Donato
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Developing countries economic regulation Enforcement Government Industrial policy Intervention LDCs Markets non‐enforcement Political economy regulatory regimes taxation
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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