Pro-Labor Institutions and Corporate Employment Efficiency
We examine how labor-friendly institutional features (i.e., laborism) relate to corporate investment efficiency in labor in a sample of firms from 33 countries over 1996–2012. We consider three dimensions of laborism—the presence of a left-leaning government, rigidity of employee protection laws, an...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of accounting, auditing & finance auditing & finance, 2022-07, Vol.37 (3), p.547-561 |
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| container_issue | 3 |
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| container_title | Journal of accounting, auditing & finance |
| container_volume | 37 |
| creator | Jung, Boochun Kang, Tony Lee, Woo-Jong Zhou, Gaoguang (Stephen) |
| description | We examine how labor-friendly institutional features (i.e., laborism) relate to corporate investment efficiency in labor in a sample of firms from 33 countries over 1996–2012. We consider three dimensions of laborism—the presence of a left-leaning government, rigidity of employee protection laws, and collectivist culture. Our evidence shows that firms operating in stronger laborism countries make less efficient labor investment decisions, which is consistent with higher labor adjustment costs associated with laborism. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1177/0148558X20929859 |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0148-558X |
| ispartof | Journal of accounting, auditing & finance, 2022-07, Vol.37 (3), p.547-561 |
| issn | 0148-558X 2160-4061 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_2668837472 |
| source | SAGE Complete A-Z List; Business Source Complete |
| subjects | Collectivism Labor costs Labor productivity |
| title | Pro-Labor Institutions and Corporate Employment Efficiency |
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