Coalition-proof stable networks

We propose the notion of coalition-proof stability for predicting the networks that could emerge when group deviations are allowed. A network is coalition-proof stable if there exists no coalition which has a credible group deviation. A coalition is said to have a credible group deviation if there i...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Review of economic design 2022-06, Vol.26 (2), p.185-209
Hauptverfasser:	Luo, Chenghong, Mauleon, Ana, Vannetelbosch, Vincent
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Behavioral/Experimental Economics Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Egalitarianism Equilibrium Game Theory Microeconomics Original Paper Social and Behav. Sciences Utility functions
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