A SOLUTION FOR THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE IN A TIME OF DATA SHARING, CONTACT TRACING, AND MASS SURVEILLANCE
Today, information is shared almost constantly. People share their DNA to track their ancestry or for individualized health information; they instruct Alexa to purchase products or provide directions; and, now more than ever, they use videoconferencing technology in their homes. According to the thi...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | The Notre Dame law review 2022-01, Vol.97 (2), p.823 |
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| container_title | The Notre Dame law review |
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| creator | Jacobi, Tonja Stonecipher, Dustin |
| description | Today, information is shared almost constantly. People share their DNA to track their ancestry or for individualized health information; they instruct Alexa to purchase products or provide directions; and, now more than ever, they use videoconferencing technology in their homes. According to the third-party doctrine, the government can access all such information without a warrant or without infringing on Fourth Amendment privacy protections. This exposure of vast amounts of highly personal data to government intrusion is permissible because the Supreme Court has interpreted the third-party doctrine as a per se rule. Hoivever, that interpretation rests on an improper understanding of the reasonable expectation of privacy standard developed in Katz v. United States. |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0745-3515 |
| ispartof | The Notre Dame law review, 2022-01, Vol.97 (2), p.823 |
| issn | 0745-3515 |
| language | eng |
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| source | Elektronische Zeitschriftenbibliothek - Frei zugängliche E-Journals; HeinOnline Law Journal Library |
| subjects | Analysis Contact tracing Contracts Data integrity Deoxyribonucleic acid Disclosure of information DNA Electronic health records Electronic surveillance Ethical aspects Evaluation Exceptions (Law) Laws, regulations and rules Management Privacy Privacy, Right of Reasonable man doctrine Supreme Court decisions Third parties (Law) |
| title | A SOLUTION FOR THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE IN A TIME OF DATA SHARING, CONTACT TRACING, AND MASS SURVEILLANCE |
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