Combating Political Corruption with Policy Bundles

In this paper, we develop a dynamic model of politicians who can engage in corruption. The model offers important insights into what determines corruption and how to design policy to combat it. We estimate the model using data from Brazil to measure voters' willingness to pay for various common...

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Veröffentlicht in:	NBER Working Paper Series 2021-04
Hauptverfasser:	Mazzocco, Maurizio, Finan, Frederico
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Anti-Korruption Brasilien Corruption Development Economics Economic theory Korruption Political Economy Politiker Willingness to pay Zahlungsbereitschaftsanalyse
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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