Reducing Nuclear Salience: How to Reassure Northeast Asian Allies

Sukin and Dalton recap the rationale for proposals to increase the prominence of nuclear weapons in the US' Northeast Asian alliances. They illustrate how nuclear-centered strategies embraced by the President Trump administration did not allay ROK and Japanese concerns about nuclear credibility...

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Veröffentlicht in:	The Washington quarterly 2021-04, Vol.44 (2), p.143-158
Hauptverfasser:	Sukin, Lauren, Dalton, Toby
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Alliances Credibility Deterrence Military readiness Nuclear weapons Presidents
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description	Sukin and Dalton recap the rationale for proposals to increase the prominence of nuclear weapons in the US' Northeast Asian alliances. They illustrate how nuclear-centered strategies embraced by the President Trump administration did not allay ROK and Japanese concerns about nuclear credibility. In addition, they show that such strategies may actually backfire by exacerbating concerns that possible rash US actions could cause or worsen crises or by contributing to a slippery slope whereby allies over-value nuclear deterrence and then desire their own nuclear weapons. They conclude by considering options for managing these problems through alliance cohesion initiatives.
doi_str_mv	10.1080/0163660X.2021.1934257
format	Article
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source	Political Science Complete; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; HeinOnline Law Journal Library
subjects	Alliances Credibility Deterrence Military readiness Nuclear weapons Presidents
title	Reducing Nuclear Salience: How to Reassure Northeast Asian Allies
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