Agency costs, board structure and institutional investors: case of India
PurposeThe author examines the role of board structure and institutional investors in dealing with the agency issues for the Indian firms by taking the data of NSE-500 nonfinancial firms for the period 2010–2019.Design/methodology/approachThe author applies dynamic panel data methodology to deal wit...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | AJAR (Asian Journal of Accounting Research) (Online) 2022-02, Vol.7 (1), p.44-58 |
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| creator | Chaudhary, Pankaj |
| description | PurposeThe author examines the role of board structure and institutional investors in dealing with the agency issues for the Indian firms by taking the data of NSE-500 nonfinancial firms for the period 2010–2019.Design/methodology/approachThe author applies dynamic panel data methodology to deal with endogeneity concerns prevalent in corporate finance variables.FindingsThe agency view is consistent with the board size in the context of India. The author observed that the board size has a harmful effect on agency cost. A larger board size may create a coordination problem, or CEO may find it easy to thrust his or her decisions on board. The author also noticed that firms should have sizeable institutional ownership, particularly pressure-insensitive investors, in equity as they can reduce agency-related issues.Originality/valueThis study focuses on one of the largest emerging economies, i.e. India. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1108/AJAR-12-2020-0130 |
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The author observed that the board size has a harmful effect on agency cost. A larger board size may create a coordination problem, or CEO may find it easy to thrust his or her decisions on board. 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| identifier | ISSN: 2443-4175 |
| ispartof | AJAR (Asian Journal of Accounting Research) (Online), 2022-02, Vol.7 (1), p.44-58 |
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| source | DOAJ Directory of Open Access Journals; Elektronische Zeitschriftenbibliothek - Frei zugängliche E-Journals; Emerald Open Access |
| subjects | agency cost board structure Boards of directors Capital markets Conflicts of interest Corporate governance Costs Dependency theory Directors governance Hypotheses Institutional investments institutional investors Related party transactions Stockholders |
| title | Agency costs, board structure and institutional investors: case of India |
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