Turnout in concurrent elections: Evidence from two quasi-experiments in Italy

We study the effects of different types of concurrent elections using individual-level administrative and survey data from Italy. Exploiting different voting ages for the two Houses of Parliament in a voter-level Regression Discontinuity Design, we find no effect of Senate voting eligibility on vote...

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Veröffentlicht in:European Journal of Political Economy 2021-12, Vol.70, p.102035, Article 102035
Hauptverfasser: Cantoni, Enrico, Gazzè, Ludovica, Schafer, Jerome
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Gazzè, Ludovica
Schafer, Jerome
description We study the effects of different types of concurrent elections using individual-level administrative and survey data from Italy. Exploiting different voting ages for the two Houses of Parliament in a voter-level Regression Discontinuity Design, we find no effect of Senate voting eligibility on voter turnout or information acquisition. We also estimate city-level Differences-in-Differences showing that concurrent high-salience municipal elections increase turnout in lower-salience provincial and European elections, but not vice-versa. These concurrency effects are concentrated in municipalities in the South of Italy, possibly due to weaker political parties and lower levels of social capital. •Senate voting eligibility does not affect voter turnout or information acquisition.•Only concurrent high-salience elections increase turnout in lower-salience ones.•Thus, “salience ceilings” may prevent concurrent elections from increasing turnout.•Increases in turnout translate into increases in valid ballot cast.•Effects are concentrated in areas with weak political parties and low social capital.
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source Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; ScienceDirect Journals (5 years ago - present)
subjects Concurrent elections
Discontinuity
Experiments
Individual differences
Italy
Legislatures
Local elections
Local government
Political economy
Political parties
Quasi-experimental methods
Regression discontinuity design
Social capital
Turnout
Voter behavior
Voter turnout
Voters
Voting
title Turnout in concurrent elections: Evidence from two quasi-experiments in Italy
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