Turnout in concurrent elections: Evidence from two quasi-experiments in Italy
We study the effects of different types of concurrent elections using individual-level administrative and survey data from Italy. Exploiting different voting ages for the two Houses of Parliament in a voter-level Regression Discontinuity Design, we find no effect of Senate voting eligibility on vote...
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Veröffentlicht in: | European Journal of Political Economy 2021-12, Vol.70, p.102035, Article 102035 |
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creator | Cantoni, Enrico Gazzè, Ludovica Schafer, Jerome |
description | We study the effects of different types of concurrent elections using individual-level administrative and survey data from Italy. Exploiting different voting ages for the two Houses of Parliament in a voter-level Regression Discontinuity Design, we find no effect of Senate voting eligibility on voter turnout or information acquisition. We also estimate city-level Differences-in-Differences showing that concurrent high-salience municipal elections increase turnout in lower-salience provincial and European elections, but not vice-versa. These concurrency effects are concentrated in municipalities in the South of Italy, possibly due to weaker political parties and lower levels of social capital.
•Senate voting eligibility does not affect voter turnout or information acquisition.•Only concurrent high-salience elections increase turnout in lower-salience ones.•Thus, “salience ceilings” may prevent concurrent elections from increasing turnout.•Increases in turnout translate into increases in valid ballot cast.•Effects are concentrated in areas with weak political parties and low social capital. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2021.102035 |
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•Senate voting eligibility does not affect voter turnout or information acquisition.•Only concurrent high-salience elections increase turnout in lower-salience ones.•Thus, “salience ceilings” may prevent concurrent elections from increasing turnout.•Increases in turnout translate into increases in valid ballot cast.•Effects are concentrated in areas with weak political parties and low social capital.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0176-2680</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1873-5703</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2021.102035</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Amsterdam: Elsevier B.V</publisher><subject>Concurrent elections ; Discontinuity ; Experiments ; Individual differences ; Italy ; Legislatures ; Local elections ; Local government ; Political economy ; Political parties ; Quasi-experimental methods ; Regression discontinuity design ; Social capital ; Turnout ; Voter behavior ; Voter turnout ; Voters ; Voting</subject><ispartof>European Journal of Political Economy, 2021-12, Vol.70, p.102035, Article 102035</ispartof><rights>2021 Elsevier B.V.</rights><rights>Copyright Elsevier Science Ltd. Dec 2021</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c421t-4e333422ff4c84fa3f6bd1c72cbfaaa54f922de25f2b7c1ebb151bb262a54add3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c421t-4e333422ff4c84fa3f6bd1c72cbfaaa54f922de25f2b7c1ebb151bb262a54add3</cites><orcidid>0000-0003-1676-8754 ; 0000-0001-6956-9439 ; 0000-0002-6267-054X</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2021.102035$$EHTML$$P50$$Gelsevier$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,3548,27923,27924,45994</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Cantoni, Enrico</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Gazzè, Ludovica</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Schafer, Jerome</creatorcontrib><title>Turnout in concurrent elections: Evidence from two quasi-experiments in Italy</title><title>European Journal of Political Economy</title><description>We study the effects of different types of concurrent elections using individual-level administrative and survey data from Italy. Exploiting different voting ages for the two Houses of Parliament in a voter-level Regression Discontinuity Design, we find no effect of Senate voting eligibility on voter turnout or information acquisition. We also estimate city-level Differences-in-Differences showing that concurrent high-salience municipal elections increase turnout in lower-salience provincial and European elections, but not vice-versa. These concurrency effects are concentrated in municipalities in the South of Italy, possibly due to weaker political parties and lower levels of social capital.
•Senate voting eligibility does not affect voter turnout or information acquisition.•Only concurrent high-salience elections increase turnout in lower-salience ones.•Thus, “salience ceilings” may prevent concurrent elections from increasing turnout.•Increases in turnout translate into increases in valid ballot cast.•Effects are concentrated in areas with weak political parties and low social capital.</description><subject>Concurrent elections</subject><subject>Discontinuity</subject><subject>Experiments</subject><subject>Individual differences</subject><subject>Italy</subject><subject>Legislatures</subject><subject>Local elections</subject><subject>Local government</subject><subject>Political economy</subject><subject>Political parties</subject><subject>Quasi-experimental methods</subject><subject>Regression discontinuity design</subject><subject>Social capital</subject><subject>Turnout</subject><subject>Voter behavior</subject><subject>Voter turnout</subject><subject>Voters</subject><subject>Voting</subject><issn>0176-2680</issn><issn>1873-5703</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2021</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7UB</sourceid><recordid>eNqFkF9LwzAUxYMoOHRfQQo-dyY36T-flDF1MPFlPoc0vYGUrdmSdrpvb0r12bwEknPOvedHyB2jC0ZZ_tAusD24HWq3AAosPgLl2QWZsbLgaVZQfklmlBV5CnlJr8k8hJbGIyooKz4j79vBd27oE9sl2nV68B67PsGY2FvXhcdkdbINdhoT490-6b9cchxUsCl-H9DbfVSH0bzu1e58S66M2gWc_9435PNltV2-pZuP1_XyeZNqAaxPBXLOBYAxQpfCKG7yumG6AF0bpVQmTAXQIGQG6kIzrGuWsbqGHOKfahp-Q-6n3IN3xwFDL1sXe8SRMopYVglRFFGVTyrtXQgejTzEhZU_S0blSE-28o-eHOnJiV40Pk1GjB1OFr0M2o4MGusjF9k4-1_EDxSCfNY</recordid><startdate>20211201</startdate><enddate>20211201</enddate><creator>Cantoni, Enrico</creator><creator>Gazzè, Ludovica</creator><creator>Schafer, Jerome</creator><general>Elsevier B.V</general><general>Elsevier Science Ltd</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7UB</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1676-8754</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6956-9439</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6267-054X</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>20211201</creationdate><title>Turnout in concurrent elections: Evidence from two quasi-experiments in Italy</title><author>Cantoni, Enrico ; Gazzè, Ludovica ; Schafer, Jerome</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c421t-4e333422ff4c84fa3f6bd1c72cbfaaa54f922de25f2b7c1ebb151bb262a54add3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2021</creationdate><topic>Concurrent elections</topic><topic>Discontinuity</topic><topic>Experiments</topic><topic>Individual differences</topic><topic>Italy</topic><topic>Legislatures</topic><topic>Local elections</topic><topic>Local government</topic><topic>Political economy</topic><topic>Political parties</topic><topic>Quasi-experimental methods</topic><topic>Regression discontinuity design</topic><topic>Social capital</topic><topic>Turnout</topic><topic>Voter behavior</topic><topic>Voter turnout</topic><topic>Voters</topic><topic>Voting</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Cantoni, Enrico</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Gazzè, Ludovica</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Schafer, Jerome</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>European Journal of Political Economy</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Cantoni, Enrico</au><au>Gazzè, Ludovica</au><au>Schafer, Jerome</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Turnout in concurrent elections: Evidence from two quasi-experiments in Italy</atitle><jtitle>European Journal of Political Economy</jtitle><date>2021-12-01</date><risdate>2021</risdate><volume>70</volume><spage>102035</spage><pages>102035-</pages><artnum>102035</artnum><issn>0176-2680</issn><eissn>1873-5703</eissn><abstract>We study the effects of different types of concurrent elections using individual-level administrative and survey data from Italy. Exploiting different voting ages for the two Houses of Parliament in a voter-level Regression Discontinuity Design, we find no effect of Senate voting eligibility on voter turnout or information acquisition. We also estimate city-level Differences-in-Differences showing that concurrent high-salience municipal elections increase turnout in lower-salience provincial and European elections, but not vice-versa. These concurrency effects are concentrated in municipalities in the South of Italy, possibly due to weaker political parties and lower levels of social capital.
•Senate voting eligibility does not affect voter turnout or information acquisition.•Only concurrent high-salience elections increase turnout in lower-salience ones.•Thus, “salience ceilings” may prevent concurrent elections from increasing turnout.•Increases in turnout translate into increases in valid ballot cast.•Effects are concentrated in areas with weak political parties and low social capital.</abstract><cop>Amsterdam</cop><pub>Elsevier B.V</pub><doi>10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2021.102035</doi><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1676-8754</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6956-9439</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6267-054X</orcidid><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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source | Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; ScienceDirect Journals (5 years ago - present) |
subjects | Concurrent elections Discontinuity Experiments Individual differences Italy Legislatures Local elections Local government Political economy Political parties Quasi-experimental methods Regression discontinuity design Social capital Turnout Voter behavior Voter turnout Voters Voting |
title | Turnout in concurrent elections: Evidence from two quasi-experiments in Italy |
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