The EU's New Economic Governance Framework and Budgetary Decision‐Making in the Member States: Boon or Bane for Throughput Legitimacy?
The euro crisis has sparked changes in the EU's economic governance framework and a crisis of legitimacy across the union. While the institutional repercussions of the crisis have been studied before, the democratic impact at the national level has received much less attention. This paper aims...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of common market studies 2022-01, Vol.60 (1), p.118-135 |
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description | The euro crisis has sparked changes in the EU's economic governance framework and a crisis of legitimacy across the union. While the institutional repercussions of the crisis have been studied before, the democratic impact at the national level has received much less attention. This paper aims to fill this gap, focusing on the procedural changes that the EU's new economic governance (NEG) framework has brought to national budgetary decision‐making. Building upon the Varieties of Democracy framework, the paper adds empirical nuance and conceptual clarity to the notion of ‘throughput legitimacy’ and its components: openness, inclusiveness, transparency and accountability. Detailed case studies of post‐crisis Austria, Italy and Portugal show that the NEG improved access to national budgetary decision‐making and enhanced executive scrutiny, while excessive complexity remains the Achilles' heel of EU fiscal rules. We submit that these procedural changes are too meaningful to be overlooked in post‐crisis debates about EU democracy. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1111/jcms.13269 |
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While the institutional repercussions of the crisis have been studied before, the democratic impact at the national level has received much less attention. This paper aims to fill this gap, focusing on the procedural changes that the EU's new economic governance (NEG) framework has brought to national budgetary decision‐making. Building upon the Varieties of Democracy framework, the paper adds empirical nuance and conceptual clarity to the notion of ‘throughput legitimacy’ and its components: openness, inclusiveness, transparency and accountability. Detailed case studies of post‐crisis Austria, Italy and Portugal show that the NEG improved access to national budgetary decision‐making and enhanced executive scrutiny, while excessive complexity remains the Achilles' heel of EU fiscal rules. 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While the institutional repercussions of the crisis have been studied before, the democratic impact at the national level has received much less attention. This paper aims to fill this gap, focusing on the procedural changes that the EU's new economic governance (NEG) framework has brought to national budgetary decision‐making. Building upon the Varieties of Democracy framework, the paper adds empirical nuance and conceptual clarity to the notion of ‘throughput legitimacy’ and its components: openness, inclusiveness, transparency and accountability. Detailed case studies of post‐crisis Austria, Italy and Portugal show that the NEG improved access to national budgetary decision‐making and enhanced executive scrutiny, while excessive complexity remains the Achilles' heel of EU fiscal rules. 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Schulz, Daniel F</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c4499-408e5223488823c81a2826b727c3d51335f24e178ff5107ed2a08d15b54621203</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2022</creationdate><topic>Accountability</topic><topic>budgetary politics</topic><topic>Case studies</topic><topic>Crises</topic><topic>Decision making</topic><topic>Democracy</topic><topic>Demokratiedefizit</topic><topic>Economic governance</topic><topic>Entscheidungsprozess bei internationalem Akteur</topic><topic>EU-/EG-Länder</topic><topic>euro area</topic><topic>Euro-Währungszone</topic><topic>Europäische Integration</topic><topic>Finanzmarktkrise</topic><topic>fiscal integration</topic><topic>Governance</topic><topic>Internationaler Vergleich/Ländervergleich</topic><topic>Italien</topic><topic>Legitimacy</topic><topic>Openness</topic><topic>Portugal</topic><topic>Rechenschaftspflicht</topic><topic>Regionale Wirtschaftskooperation</topic><topic>Rules</topic><topic>Scrutiny</topic><topic>Steuerpolitik</topic><topic>Steuersystem</topic><topic>throughput legitimacy</topic><topic>Transparency</topic><topic>Transparenz politischer/administrativer Prozesse</topic><topic>Österreich</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Csehi, Robert</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Schulz, Daniel F</creatorcontrib><collection>EconStor</collection><collection>Wiley Online Library Open Access</collection><collection>Wiley Free Content</collection><collection>ECONIS</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Journal of common market studies</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Csehi, Robert</au><au>Schulz, Daniel F</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>The EU's New Economic Governance Framework and Budgetary Decision‐Making in the Member States: Boon or Bane for Throughput Legitimacy?</atitle><jtitle>Journal of common market studies</jtitle><date>2022-01</date><risdate>2022</risdate><volume>60</volume><issue>1</issue><spage>118</spage><epage>135</epage><pages>118-135</pages><issn>1468-5965</issn><issn>0021-9886</issn><eissn>1468-5965</eissn><abstract>The euro crisis has sparked changes in the EU's economic governance framework and a crisis of legitimacy across the union. While the institutional repercussions of the crisis have been studied before, the democratic impact at the national level has received much less attention. This paper aims to fill this gap, focusing on the procedural changes that the EU's new economic governance (NEG) framework has brought to national budgetary decision‐making. Building upon the Varieties of Democracy framework, the paper adds empirical nuance and conceptual clarity to the notion of ‘throughput legitimacy’ and its components: openness, inclusiveness, transparency and accountability. Detailed case studies of post‐crisis Austria, Italy and Portugal show that the NEG improved access to national budgetary decision‐making and enhanced executive scrutiny, while excessive complexity remains the Achilles' heel of EU fiscal rules. 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subjects | Accountability budgetary politics Case studies Crises Decision making Democracy Demokratiedefizit Economic governance Entscheidungsprozess bei internationalem Akteur EU-/EG-Länder euro area Euro-Währungszone Europäische Integration Finanzmarktkrise fiscal integration Governance Internationaler Vergleich/Ländervergleich Italien Legitimacy Openness Portugal Rechenschaftspflicht Regionale Wirtschaftskooperation Rules Scrutiny Steuerpolitik Steuersystem throughput legitimacy Transparency Transparenz politischer/administrativer Prozesse Österreich |
title | The EU's New Economic Governance Framework and Budgetary Decision‐Making in the Member States: Boon or Bane for Throughput Legitimacy? |
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