The EU's New Economic Governance Framework and Budgetary Decision‐Making in the Member States: Boon or Bane for Throughput Legitimacy?

The euro crisis has sparked changes in the EU's economic governance framework and a crisis of legitimacy across the union. While the institutional repercussions of the crisis have been studied before, the democratic impact at the national level has received much less attention. This paper aims...

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of common market studies 2022-01, Vol.60 (1), p.118-135
Hauptverfasser: Csehi, Robert, Schulz, Daniel F
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description The euro crisis has sparked changes in the EU's economic governance framework and a crisis of legitimacy across the union. While the institutional repercussions of the crisis have been studied before, the democratic impact at the national level has received much less attention. This paper aims to fill this gap, focusing on the procedural changes that the EU's new economic governance (NEG) framework has brought to national budgetary decision‐making. Building upon the Varieties of Democracy framework, the paper adds empirical nuance and conceptual clarity to the notion of ‘throughput legitimacy’ and its components: openness, inclusiveness, transparency and accountability. Detailed case studies of post‐crisis Austria, Italy and Portugal show that the NEG improved access to national budgetary decision‐making and enhanced executive scrutiny, while excessive complexity remains the Achilles' heel of EU fiscal rules. We submit that these procedural changes are too meaningful to be overlooked in post‐crisis debates about EU democracy.
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source Wiley Online Library Journals Frontfile Complete; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Business Source Complete; Political Science Complete
subjects Accountability
budgetary politics
Case studies
Crises
Decision making
Democracy
Demokratiedefizit
Economic governance
Entscheidungsprozess bei internationalem Akteur
EU-/EG-Länder
euro area
Euro-Währungszone
Europäische Integration
Finanzmarktkrise
fiscal integration
Governance
Internationaler Vergleich/Ländervergleich
Italien
Legitimacy
Openness
Portugal
Rechenschaftspflicht
Regionale Wirtschaftskooperation
Rules
Scrutiny
Steuerpolitik
Steuersystem
throughput legitimacy
Transparency
Transparenz politischer/administrativer Prozesse
Österreich
title The EU's New Economic Governance Framework and Budgetary Decision‐Making in the Member States: Boon or Bane for Throughput Legitimacy?
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