The Effect of Austerity Packages on Government Popularity During the Great Recession

During the Great Recession, governments across the continent implemented austerity policies. A large literature claims that such policies are surprisingly popular and have few electoral costs. This article revisits this question by studying the popularity of governments during the economic crisis. T...

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Veröffentlicht in:British journal of political science 2022-01, Vol.52 (1), p.181-199
Hauptverfasser: Bojar, Abel, Bremer, Björn, Kriesi, Hanspeter, Wang, Chendi
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Kriesi, Hanspeter
Wang, Chendi
description During the Great Recession, governments across the continent implemented austerity policies. A large literature claims that such policies are surprisingly popular and have few electoral costs. This article revisits this question by studying the popularity of governments during the economic crisis. The authors assemble a pooled time-series data set for monthly support for ruling parties from fifteen European countries and treat austerity packages as intervention variables to the underlying popularity series. Using time-series analysis, this permits the careful tracking of the impact of austerity packages over time. The main empirical contributions are twofold. First, the study shows that, on average, austerity packages hurt incumbent parties in opinion polls. Secondly, it demonstrates that the magnitude of this electoral punishment is contingent on the economic and political context: in instances of rising unemployment, the involvement of external creditors and high protest intensity, the cumulative impact of austerity on government popularity becomes considerable.
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source PAIS Index; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Cambridge University Press Journals Complete
subjects Austerity policy
Creditors
Debates
Economic conditions
Economic crisis
Economic policy
Elections
Government
Government spending
Great Recession
Hypotheses
Intervention
Political parties
Political science
Politics
Popularity
Public opinion surveys
Punishment
Recessions
Tracking
Unemployment
Voter behavior
Voters
title The Effect of Austerity Packages on Government Popularity During the Great Recession
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