Curbing overstocking on rangeland through subsidies, rewards, and herders’ social capital: Lessons from Qinghai province, China
Restoring rangeland ecology, a goal set by the Rangeland Ecological Protection Subsidy and Reward (REPSR) scheme of China, depends on how effectively livestock overload can be curbed. Besides subsidies and rewards, herders' individual social capital also bears an important weight on their willi...
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description | Restoring rangeland ecology, a goal set by the Rangeland Ecological Protection Subsidy and Reward (REPSR) scheme of China, depends on how effectively livestock overload can be curbed. Besides subsidies and rewards, herders' individual social capital also bears an important weight on their willingness to lower stocking rate. Social network offers an invisible conduit for herders to build up social capital, thus quantifying social capital through social network analysis is more straightforward than simply using proxy indicators, an approach commonly adopted so far. Based on a questionnaire survey on 288 households in Qinghai province, the effects of social capital and the REPSR compensation on stocking rate are empirically examined, replacing the traditional proxies of social capital with herders' ability to obtain information and resources as well as the restrictions imposed by social norms from social networks. Social capital is found to have a statistically significant impact on stocking rate, but tradeoffs exist among various network pathways. Herders’ acquisition of policy information and stall-feeding skills through social networks contributes to lower stocking rate, but acquisition of grazing experience, funds and machinery service exerts counteracting effects. A U-shaped relationship occurs between stocking rate and compensation amount offered by the REPSR: with the increase of compensation amount, herders lower stocking rate first and then increase it. To improve the effectiveness of the REPSR scheme, a refinement on the compensation scheme tailored to differential scales of household rangeland operation is the key, meanwhile weaving and harnessing social network to improve policy publicity and enforcement as well as knowledge sharing and production cooperation between herdsmen also deserve more attention.
•Effects of ecological compensation and social capital on stocking rate are examined.•Herders' social capital is quantified by matrix operation on social networks.•A U-shaped relationship is found between stocking rate and compensation amount.•Tradeoffs exist in the impacts of differential network pathways on stocking rate.•Key network actors are identified and their potential leadership is explored. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.jrurstud.2021.09.028 |
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•Effects of ecological compensation and social capital on stocking rate are examined.•Herders' social capital is quantified by matrix operation on social networks.•A U-shaped relationship is found between stocking rate and compensation amount.•Tradeoffs exist in the impacts of differential network pathways on stocking rate.•Key network actors are identified and their potential leadership is explored.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0743-0167</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1873-1392</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1016/j.jrurstud.2021.09.028</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>OXFORD: Elsevier Ltd</publisher><subject>Compensation ; Cooperation ; Ecology ; Enforcement ; Farmers ; Geography ; Grazing ; Households ; Human ecology ; Livestock ; Livestock production ; Network analysis ; Norms ; Pastoralism ; Public Administration ; Publicity ; Qinghai province ; Rangeland conservation ; Rangelands ; Regional & Urban Planning ; Reinforcement ; Rewards ; Social capital ; Social interactions ; Social network ; Social network analysis ; Social networks ; Social norms ; Social organization ; Social Sciences ; Social skills ; Statistical analysis ; Stocking ; Stocking rate ; Subsidies ; Weaving</subject><ispartof>Journal of rural studies, 2021-10, Vol.87, p.361-374</ispartof><rights>2021 Elsevier Ltd</rights><rights>Copyright Elsevier Science Ltd. Oct 2021</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>true</woscitedreferencessubscribed><woscitedreferencescount>15</woscitedreferencescount><woscitedreferencesoriginalsourcerecordid>wos000708546100011</woscitedreferencesoriginalsourcerecordid><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c340t-456fbdb5296223b3a755d21ec3f9d7d8e69d9d436dbfd8940197b8aed030e8bc3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c340t-456fbdb5296223b3a755d21ec3f9d7d8e69d9d436dbfd8940197b8aed030e8bc3</cites><orcidid>0000-0003-4291-7979 ; 0000-0002-1929-6687</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2021.09.028$$EHTML$$P50$$Gelsevier$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>315,782,786,3552,27931,27932,33781,39264,46002</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Ding, Rui</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Shao, Liqun</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Chen, Haibin</creatorcontrib><title>Curbing overstocking on rangeland through subsidies, rewards, and herders’ social capital: Lessons from Qinghai province, China</title><title>Journal of rural studies</title><addtitle>J RURAL STUD</addtitle><description>Restoring rangeland ecology, a goal set by the Rangeland Ecological Protection Subsidy and Reward (REPSR) scheme of China, depends on how effectively livestock overload can be curbed. Besides subsidies and rewards, herders' individual social capital also bears an important weight on their willingness to lower stocking rate. Social network offers an invisible conduit for herders to build up social capital, thus quantifying social capital through social network analysis is more straightforward than simply using proxy indicators, an approach commonly adopted so far. Based on a questionnaire survey on 288 households in Qinghai province, the effects of social capital and the REPSR compensation on stocking rate are empirically examined, replacing the traditional proxies of social capital with herders' ability to obtain information and resources as well as the restrictions imposed by social norms from social networks. Social capital is found to have a statistically significant impact on stocking rate, but tradeoffs exist among various network pathways. Herders’ acquisition of policy information and stall-feeding skills through social networks contributes to lower stocking rate, but acquisition of grazing experience, funds and machinery service exerts counteracting effects. A U-shaped relationship occurs between stocking rate and compensation amount offered by the REPSR: with the increase of compensation amount, herders lower stocking rate first and then increase it. To improve the effectiveness of the REPSR scheme, a refinement on the compensation scheme tailored to differential scales of household rangeland operation is the key, meanwhile weaving and harnessing social network to improve policy publicity and enforcement as well as knowledge sharing and production cooperation between herdsmen also deserve more attention.
•Effects of ecological compensation and social capital on stocking rate are examined.•Herders' social capital is quantified by matrix operation on social networks.•A U-shaped relationship is found between stocking rate and compensation amount.•Tradeoffs exist in the impacts of differential network pathways on stocking rate.•Key network actors are identified and their potential leadership is explored.</description><subject>Compensation</subject><subject>Cooperation</subject><subject>Ecology</subject><subject>Enforcement</subject><subject>Farmers</subject><subject>Geography</subject><subject>Grazing</subject><subject>Households</subject><subject>Human ecology</subject><subject>Livestock</subject><subject>Livestock production</subject><subject>Network analysis</subject><subject>Norms</subject><subject>Pastoralism</subject><subject>Public Administration</subject><subject>Publicity</subject><subject>Qinghai province</subject><subject>Rangeland conservation</subject><subject>Rangelands</subject><subject>Regional & Urban Planning</subject><subject>Reinforcement</subject><subject>Rewards</subject><subject>Social capital</subject><subject>Social interactions</subject><subject>Social network</subject><subject>Social network analysis</subject><subject>Social networks</subject><subject>Social norms</subject><subject>Social organization</subject><subject>Social Sciences</subject><subject>Social skills</subject><subject>Statistical analysis</subject><subject>Stocking</subject><subject>Stocking rate</subject><subject>Subsidies</subject><subject>Weaving</subject><issn>0743-0167</issn><issn>1873-1392</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2021</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>GIZIO</sourceid><sourceid>BHHNA</sourceid><recordid>eNqNkMGO0zAQhiMEEmXhFZAljmzC2E6cmBMoggWpEkKCs-XYk8ahaxc76YobPAavt0-CSxeucPJY_r-Z8VcUTylUFKh4MVdzXGNaVlsxYLQCWQHr7hUb2rW8pFyy-8UG2pqXOd0-LB6lNAPQFiTbFD_6NQ7O70g4Yu4RzJffF0-i9jvca2_JMsWw7iaS1iE56zBdkog3OtpcnN4njDazt99_khSM03ti9MEtev-SbDGl4BMZY7gmH3PnSTtyiOHovMFL0k_O68fFg1HvEz65Oy-Kz2_ffOrfldsPV-_719vS8BqWsm7EONihYVIwxgeu26axjKLho7St7VBIK23NhR1G28kaqGyHTqMFDtgNhl8Uz8598_yvK6ZFzWGNPo9UTICQnNZU5JQ4p0wMKUUc1SG6ax2_KQrqpFvN6o9uddKtQKqsO4PPz-ANDmFMxmH-4l8YAFromlrQXFGa093_p_ssc3HB92H1S0ZfnVHMso4Oo7rDrYtoFmWD-9euvwD7_bDh</recordid><startdate>202110</startdate><enddate>202110</enddate><creator>Ding, Rui</creator><creator>Shao, Liqun</creator><creator>Chen, Haibin</creator><general>Elsevier Ltd</general><general>Elsevier</general><general>Elsevier Science Ltd</general><scope>17B</scope><scope>BLEPL</scope><scope>DVR</scope><scope>EGQ</scope><scope>GIZIO</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7ST</scope><scope>7U4</scope><scope>7U6</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>BHHNA</scope><scope>C1K</scope><scope>DWI</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>WZK</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4291-7979</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1929-6687</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>202110</creationdate><title>Curbing overstocking on rangeland through subsidies, rewards, and herders’ social capital: Lessons from Qinghai province, China</title><author>Ding, Rui ; Shao, Liqun ; Chen, Haibin</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c340t-456fbdb5296223b3a755d21ec3f9d7d8e69d9d436dbfd8940197b8aed030e8bc3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2021</creationdate><topic>Compensation</topic><topic>Cooperation</topic><topic>Ecology</topic><topic>Enforcement</topic><topic>Farmers</topic><topic>Geography</topic><topic>Grazing</topic><topic>Households</topic><topic>Human ecology</topic><topic>Livestock</topic><topic>Livestock production</topic><topic>Network analysis</topic><topic>Norms</topic><topic>Pastoralism</topic><topic>Public Administration</topic><topic>Publicity</topic><topic>Qinghai province</topic><topic>Rangeland conservation</topic><topic>Rangelands</topic><topic>Regional & Urban Planning</topic><topic>Reinforcement</topic><topic>Rewards</topic><topic>Social capital</topic><topic>Social interactions</topic><topic>Social network</topic><topic>Social network analysis</topic><topic>Social networks</topic><topic>Social norms</topic><topic>Social organization</topic><topic>Social Sciences</topic><topic>Social skills</topic><topic>Statistical analysis</topic><topic>Stocking</topic><topic>Stocking rate</topic><topic>Subsidies</topic><topic>Weaving</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Ding, Rui</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Shao, Liqun</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Chen, Haibin</creatorcontrib><collection>Web of Knowledge</collection><collection>Web of Science Core Collection</collection><collection>Social Sciences Citation Index</collection><collection>Web of Science Primary (SCIE, SSCI & AHCI)</collection><collection>Web of Science - Social Sciences Citation Index – 2021</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Environment Abstracts</collection><collection>Sociological Abstracts (pre-2017)</collection><collection>Sustainability Science Abstracts</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>Sociological Abstracts</collection><collection>Environmental Sciences and Pollution Management</collection><collection>Sociological Abstracts</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>Sociological Abstracts (Ovid)</collection><jtitle>Journal of rural studies</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Ding, Rui</au><au>Shao, Liqun</au><au>Chen, Haibin</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Curbing overstocking on rangeland through subsidies, rewards, and herders’ social capital: Lessons from Qinghai province, China</atitle><jtitle>Journal of rural studies</jtitle><stitle>J RURAL STUD</stitle><date>2021-10</date><risdate>2021</risdate><volume>87</volume><spage>361</spage><epage>374</epage><pages>361-374</pages><issn>0743-0167</issn><eissn>1873-1392</eissn><abstract>Restoring rangeland ecology, a goal set by the Rangeland Ecological Protection Subsidy and Reward (REPSR) scheme of China, depends on how effectively livestock overload can be curbed. Besides subsidies and rewards, herders' individual social capital also bears an important weight on their willingness to lower stocking rate. Social network offers an invisible conduit for herders to build up social capital, thus quantifying social capital through social network analysis is more straightforward than simply using proxy indicators, an approach commonly adopted so far. Based on a questionnaire survey on 288 households in Qinghai province, the effects of social capital and the REPSR compensation on stocking rate are empirically examined, replacing the traditional proxies of social capital with herders' ability to obtain information and resources as well as the restrictions imposed by social norms from social networks. Social capital is found to have a statistically significant impact on stocking rate, but tradeoffs exist among various network pathways. Herders’ acquisition of policy information and stall-feeding skills through social networks contributes to lower stocking rate, but acquisition of grazing experience, funds and machinery service exerts counteracting effects. A U-shaped relationship occurs between stocking rate and compensation amount offered by the REPSR: with the increase of compensation amount, herders lower stocking rate first and then increase it. To improve the effectiveness of the REPSR scheme, a refinement on the compensation scheme tailored to differential scales of household rangeland operation is the key, meanwhile weaving and harnessing social network to improve policy publicity and enforcement as well as knowledge sharing and production cooperation between herdsmen also deserve more attention.
•Effects of ecological compensation and social capital on stocking rate are examined.•Herders' social capital is quantified by matrix operation on social networks.•A U-shaped relationship is found between stocking rate and compensation amount.•Tradeoffs exist in the impacts of differential network pathways on stocking rate.•Key network actors are identified and their potential leadership is explored.</abstract><cop>OXFORD</cop><pub>Elsevier Ltd</pub><doi>10.1016/j.jrurstud.2021.09.028</doi><tpages>14</tpages><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4291-7979</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1929-6687</orcidid></addata></record> |
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subjects | Compensation Cooperation Ecology Enforcement Farmers Geography Grazing Households Human ecology Livestock Livestock production Network analysis Norms Pastoralism Public Administration Publicity Qinghai province Rangeland conservation Rangelands Regional & Urban Planning Reinforcement Rewards Social capital Social interactions Social network Social network analysis Social networks Social norms Social organization Social Sciences Social skills Statistical analysis Stocking Stocking rate Subsidies Weaving |
title | Curbing overstocking on rangeland through subsidies, rewards, and herders’ social capital: Lessons from Qinghai province, China |
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