On the Sustainability of Technology Licensing Under Asymmetric Information Game

Past research indicates that a licensor tends to adopt the fixed fee, in order to obtain higher profit rather than secure royalty when he participates in zero production in the market. This study instead finds that the patentee’s optimum strategy may vary. In addition to the fixed-fee strategy, roya...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Sustainability 2019-12, Vol.11 (24), p.6959
Hauptverfasser:	Tsai, Chien-Shu, Tsai, Ting-Chung, Ko, Po-Sheng, Lee, Chien-Hui, Lee, Jen-Yao, Wang, Yu-Lin
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Competition Cost control Innovations Licenses Licensing Licensing (technology) Literature reviews Pricing policies R&D Research & development Royalties Strategy Sustainability Tariffs
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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