On the Sustainability of Technology Licensing Under Asymmetric Information Game
Past research indicates that a licensor tends to adopt the fixed fee, in order to obtain higher profit rather than secure royalty when he participates in zero production in the market. This study instead finds that the patentee’s optimum strategy may vary. In addition to the fixed-fee strategy, roya...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Sustainability 2019-12, Vol.11 (24), p.6959 |
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| creator | Tsai, Chien-Shu Tsai, Ting-Chung Ko, Po-Sheng Lee, Chien-Hui Lee, Jen-Yao Wang, Yu-Lin |
| description | Past research indicates that a licensor tends to adopt the fixed fee, in order to obtain higher profit rather than secure royalty when he participates in zero production in the market. This study instead finds that the patentee’s optimum strategy may vary. In addition to the fixed-fee strategy, royalty or mixed licensing, or fixed fee plus royalty may be potential choices for the patentee as well which is depend on the market scale, incidence of market scale, and magnitude of cost-saving. The patentee may choose to only authorize a type of high market size based on self-interested motives. The technology licensing market is not sustainable. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.3390/su11246959 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Sustainability, 2019-12, Vol.11 (24), p.6959 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | MDPI - Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute; Elektronische Zeitschriftenbibliothek - Frei zugängliche E-Journals |
| subjects | Competition Cost control Innovations Licenses Licensing Licensing (technology) Literature reviews Pricing policies R&D Research & development Royalties Strategy Sustainability Tariffs |
| title | On the Sustainability of Technology Licensing Under Asymmetric Information Game |
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