Optimal Income Taxation: Mirrlees Meets Ramsey

We explore the optimal shape of the income tax and transfer schedule in an environment with distinct roles for public and private insurance. In a calibration to the United States, we find that the optimal system features marginal tax rates that increase in income. When we increase pressure on the go...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	The Journal of political economy 2021-11, Vol.129 (11), p.3141-3184
Hauptverfasser:	Heathcote, Jonathan, Tsujiyama, Hitoshi
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Economic theory Einkommensteuertarif Grenzsteuersatz Income taxes Insurance Optimale Besteuerung Political economy Social welfare Steuereinnahmen Tax rates Taxation Theorie
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
Tags:	Tag hinzufügen Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!

container_end_page	3184
container_issue	11
container_start_page	3141
container_title	The Journal of political economy
container_volume	129
creator	Heathcote, Jonathan Tsujiyama, Hitoshi
description	We explore the optimal shape of the income tax and transfer schedule in an environment with distinct roles for public and private insurance. In a calibration to the United States, we find that the optimal system features marginal tax rates that increase in income. When we increase pressure on the government to raise revenue, the optimal marginal tax schedule becomes first flatter and then U-shaped, reconciling various findings in the literature. A power function parametric tax schedule outperforms an affine one, indicating that tax progressivity is more important than lump-sum transfers. We also explore various social welfare objectives and Pareto-improving reforms.
doi_str_mv	10.1086/715851
format	Article
fullrecord	<record><control><sourceid>proquest_econi</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2582498495</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>2582498495</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c468t-ab23aaca3847c0a0f33fa2d669b6d652e02d02b49fffe1fb0f4790c4e90e44ce3</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNpF0E1Lw0AQBuBFFKxVf0NA8ZY6-5XdeBPxo9BSkArewmY7qyltNu6mYP-9Kyl0LnN5eF9mCLmmMKGgi3tFpZb0hIyo5CqXXHyekhEAYznXoM_JRYxrSEOBj8hk0fXN1myyaWv9FrOl-TV949uHbN6EsEGM2Ryxj9m72UbcX5IzZzYRrw57TD5enpdPb_ls8Tp9epzlVhS6z03NuDHWcC2UBQOOc2fYqijKulgVkiGwFbBalM45pK4GJ1QJVmAJKIRFPiY3Q24X_M8OY1-t_S60qbJiUjNRalHKpO4GZYOPMaCrupCOCfuKQvX_i2r4RYLZANH6tolHppRMOYqLRG4HsrPfjTVfvgsY47H2kPQHz3tmTQ</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>2582498495</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Optimal Income Taxation: Mirrlees Meets Ramsey</title><source>University of Chicago Press Journals (Full run)</source><source>PAIS Index</source><source>Business Source Complete</source><creator>Heathcote, Jonathan ; Tsujiyama, Hitoshi</creator><creatorcontrib>Heathcote, Jonathan ; Tsujiyama, Hitoshi</creatorcontrib><description>We explore the optimal shape of the income tax and transfer schedule in an environment with distinct roles for public and private insurance. In a calibration to the United States, we find that the optimal system features marginal tax rates that increase in income. When we increase pressure on the government to raise revenue, the optimal marginal tax schedule becomes first flatter and then U-shaped, reconciling various findings in the literature. A power function parametric tax schedule outperforms an affine one, indicating that tax progressivity is more important than lump-sum transfers. We also explore various social welfare objectives and Pareto-improving reforms.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0022-3808</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1537-534X</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1086/715851</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Chicago: The University of Chicago Press</publisher><subject>Economic theory ; Einkommensteuertarif ; Grenzsteuersatz ; Income taxes ; Insurance ; Optimale Besteuerung ; Political economy ; Social welfare ; Steuereinnahmen ; Tax rates ; Taxation ; Theorie</subject><ispartof>The Journal of political economy, 2021-11, Vol.129 (11), p.3141-3184</ispartof><rights>2021 The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.</rights><rights>Copyright University of Chicago, acting through its Press Nov 2021</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c468t-ab23aaca3847c0a0f33fa2d669b6d652e02d02b49fffe1fb0f4790c4e90e44ce3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c468t-ab23aaca3847c0a0f33fa2d669b6d652e02d02b49fffe1fb0f4790c4e90e44ce3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdf/10.1086%2F715851$$EPDF$$P50$$Guchicagopress$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086%2F715851$$EHTML$$P50$$Guchicagopress$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,27843,27901,27902,53994,53998</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Heathcote, Jonathan</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Tsujiyama, Hitoshi</creatorcontrib><title>Optimal Income Taxation: Mirrlees Meets Ramsey</title><title>The Journal of political economy</title><description>We explore the optimal shape of the income tax and transfer schedule in an environment with distinct roles for public and private insurance. In a calibration to the United States, we find that the optimal system features marginal tax rates that increase in income. When we increase pressure on the government to raise revenue, the optimal marginal tax schedule becomes first flatter and then U-shaped, reconciling various findings in the literature. A power function parametric tax schedule outperforms an affine one, indicating that tax progressivity is more important than lump-sum transfers. We also explore various social welfare objectives and Pareto-improving reforms.</description><subject>Economic theory</subject><subject>Einkommensteuertarif</subject><subject>Grenzsteuersatz</subject><subject>Income taxes</subject><subject>Insurance</subject><subject>Optimale Besteuerung</subject><subject>Political economy</subject><subject>Social welfare</subject><subject>Steuereinnahmen</subject><subject>Tax rates</subject><subject>Taxation</subject><subject>Theorie</subject><issn>0022-3808</issn><issn>1537-534X</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2021</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7TQ</sourceid><recordid>eNpF0E1Lw0AQBuBFFKxVf0NA8ZY6-5XdeBPxo9BSkArewmY7qyltNu6mYP-9Kyl0LnN5eF9mCLmmMKGgi3tFpZb0hIyo5CqXXHyekhEAYznXoM_JRYxrSEOBj8hk0fXN1myyaWv9FrOl-TV949uHbN6EsEGM2Ryxj9m72UbcX5IzZzYRrw57TD5enpdPb_ls8Tp9epzlVhS6z03NuDHWcC2UBQOOc2fYqijKulgVkiGwFbBalM45pK4GJ1QJVmAJKIRFPiY3Q24X_M8OY1-t_S60qbJiUjNRalHKpO4GZYOPMaCrupCOCfuKQvX_i2r4RYLZANH6tolHppRMOYqLRG4HsrPfjTVfvgsY47H2kPQHz3tmTQ</recordid><startdate>20211101</startdate><enddate>20211101</enddate><creator>Heathcote, Jonathan</creator><creator>Tsujiyama, Hitoshi</creator><general>The University of Chicago Press</general><general>University of Chicago, acting through its Press</general><scope>OQ6</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7TQ</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>DHY</scope><scope>DON</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20211101</creationdate><title>Optimal Income Taxation: Mirrlees Meets Ramsey</title><author>Heathcote, Jonathan ; Tsujiyama, Hitoshi</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c468t-ab23aaca3847c0a0f33fa2d669b6d652e02d02b49fffe1fb0f4790c4e90e44ce3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2021</creationdate><topic>Economic theory</topic><topic>Einkommensteuertarif</topic><topic>Grenzsteuersatz</topic><topic>Income taxes</topic><topic>Insurance</topic><topic>Optimale Besteuerung</topic><topic>Political economy</topic><topic>Social welfare</topic><topic>Steuereinnahmen</topic><topic>Tax rates</topic><topic>Taxation</topic><topic>Theorie</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Heathcote, Jonathan</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Tsujiyama, Hitoshi</creatorcontrib><collection>ECONIS</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>PAIS Index</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>PAIS International</collection><collection>PAIS International (Ovid)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>The Journal of political economy</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Heathcote, Jonathan</au><au>Tsujiyama, Hitoshi</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Optimal Income Taxation: Mirrlees Meets Ramsey</atitle><jtitle>The Journal of political economy</jtitle><date>2021-11-01</date><risdate>2021</risdate><volume>129</volume><issue>11</issue><spage>3141</spage><epage>3184</epage><pages>3141-3184</pages><issn>0022-3808</issn><eissn>1537-534X</eissn><abstract>We explore the optimal shape of the income tax and transfer schedule in an environment with distinct roles for public and private insurance. In a calibration to the United States, we find that the optimal system features marginal tax rates that increase in income. When we increase pressure on the government to raise revenue, the optimal marginal tax schedule becomes first flatter and then U-shaped, reconciling various findings in the literature. A power function parametric tax schedule outperforms an affine one, indicating that tax progressivity is more important than lump-sum transfers. We also explore various social welfare objectives and Pareto-improving reforms.</abstract><cop>Chicago</cop><pub>The University of Chicago Press</pub><doi>10.1086/715851</doi><tpages>44</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record>
fulltext	fulltext
identifier	ISSN: 0022-3808
ispartof	The Journal of political economy, 2021-11, Vol.129 (11), p.3141-3184
issn	0022-3808 1537-534X
language	eng
recordid	cdi_proquest_journals_2582498495
source	University of Chicago Press Journals (Full run); PAIS Index; Business Source Complete
subjects	Economic theory Einkommensteuertarif Grenzsteuersatz Income taxes Insurance Optimale Besteuerung Political economy Social welfare Steuereinnahmen Tax rates Taxation Theorie
title	Optimal Income Taxation: Mirrlees Meets Ramsey
url	https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-02-15T19%3A30%3A20IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_econi&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Optimal%20Income%20Taxation:%20Mirrlees%20Meets%20Ramsey&rft.jtitle=The%20Journal%20of%20political%20economy&rft.au=Heathcote,%20Jonathan&rft.date=2021-11-01&rft.volume=129&rft.issue=11&rft.spage=3141&rft.epage=3184&rft.pages=3141-3184&rft.issn=0022-3808&rft.eissn=1537-534X&rft_id=info:doi/10.1086/715851&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_econi%3E2582498495%3C/proquest_econi%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=2582498495&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true