Monitoring or payroll maximization? What happens when workers enter the boardroom?

We examine whether worker representation on corporate boards results in improved monitoring or payroll maximization. Several economic theories predict that worker representatives would use control and voting rights in the boardroom to transform firm assets into private benefits and increased wages,...

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Veröffentlicht in:Review of accounting studies 2021-09, Vol.26 (3), p.1046-1087
Hauptverfasser: Gleason, Cristi A, Kieback, Sascha, Thomsen, Martin, Watrin, Christoph
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Sprache:eng
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