The whip and the Bible: Punishment versus internalization

A variety of experimental and empirical research indicate that prosocial behavior is important for economic success. There are two sources of prosocial behavior: incentives and preferences. The latter, the willingness of individuals to “do their bit” for the group, we refer to as internalization, be...

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of public economic theory 2021-10, Vol.23 (5), p.858-894
Hauptverfasser: Dutta, Rohan, Levine, David K., Modica, Salvatore
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creator Dutta, Rohan
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description A variety of experimental and empirical research indicate that prosocial behavior is important for economic success. There are two sources of prosocial behavior: incentives and preferences. The latter, the willingness of individuals to “do their bit” for the group, we refer to as internalization, because we view it as something that a group can influence by appropriate investment. This implies that there is a trade‐off between using incentives and internalization to encourage prosocial behavior. By examining this trade‐off we shed light on the connection between social norms observed inside the laboratory and those observed outside in the field. For example, we show that a higher value of cooperation outside the laboratory may lower the use of incentives inside the laboratory even as it increases their usage outside. As an application we show that the model calibrated to experimental data makes reasonable out‐of‐sample quantitative forecasts.
doi_str_mv 10.1111/jpet.12540
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subjects Economic theory
Laboratories
title The whip and the Bible: Punishment versus internalization
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