FULLY UNDERSTANDING CONCEPT POSSESSION

Can subjects genuinely possess concepts they do not understand fully? A simple argument can show that, on the assumption that possession conditions are taken to fully individuate concepts, this question must be answered in the negative. In this paper, I examine this negative answer as possibly artic...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Crítica; revista hispanoamericana de filosofía 2018-04, Vol.50 (148), p.3-28
1. Verfasser:	Verdejo, Víctor M.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	anti-individualism Artículos concept individuation determination challenge Epistemology Explicit knowledge Identity formation implicit conceptions Knowledge partial understanding Peacocke, Christopher
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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