Replacing Bureaucrats with Automated Sorcerers?
Increasingly, federal agencies employ artificial intelligence to help direct their enforcement efforts, adjudicate claims and other matters, and craft regulations or regulatory approaches. Theoretically, artificial intelligence could enable agencies to address endemic problems, most notably 1) the i...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Daedalus (Cambridge, Mass.) Mass.), 2021-07, Vol.150 (3), p.89-103 |
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description | Increasingly, federal agencies employ artificial intelligence to help direct their enforcement efforts, adjudicate claims and other matters, and craft regulations or regulatory approaches. Theoretically, artificial intelligence could enable agencies to address endemic problems, most notably 1) the inconsistent decision-making and departure from policy attributable to low-level officials’ exercise of discretion; and 2) the imprecise nature of agency rules. But two characteristics of artificial intelligence, its opaqueness and the nonintuitive nature of its correlations, threaten core values of administrative law. Administrative law reflects the principles that 1) persons be judged individually according to announced criteria; 2) administrative regulations reflect some means-end rationality; and 3) administrative decisions be subject to review by external actors and transparent to the public. Artificial intelligence has adverse implications for all three of those critical norms. The resultant tension, at least for now, will constrain administrative agencies’ most ambitious potential uses of artificial intelligence. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1162/daed_a_01861 |
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The resultant tension, at least for now, will constrain administrative agencies’ most ambitious potential uses of artificial intelligence.</description><subject>Administrative law</subject><subject>Ambition</subject><subject>Artificial intelligence</subject><subject>Decision making</subject><subject>Enforcement</subject><subject>Government agencies</subject><subject>Intelligence</subject><subject>Norms</subject><subject>Rationality</subject><subject>Regulation</subject><subject>Regulations</subject><issn>0011-5266</issn><issn>1548-6192</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2021</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7TQ</sourceid><recordid>eNp1kE1LAzEQhoMoWKs3r8KCFw-unckm2exJavELCoIf55BmE93Sdtckq-ivd8uKFNHTHOZ5nxleQg4RzhAFHZXalkorQClwiwyQM5kKLOg2GQAgppwKsUv2QpgDABOUD8jo3jYLbarVc3LReqtb43UMyXsVX5JxG-uljrZMHmpvrLc-nO-THacXwR58zyF5urp8nNyk07vr28l4mhqGLKY5Wi5lgSbXkHMhpCk56FmJWlLDdcEoNVg6M8tnwjhwLi8hk8yBySmiy7IhOe69ja9fWxuimtetX3UnFeUi4yA4KzrqtKeMr0Pw1qnGV0vtPxSCWleiNivp8JMeX1Ybvn_Q8R_oGnlDDlWmMloIThUFSru4olJ9Vs1vx1HvmIdY-5_XWLcTouDZF_aPf4w</recordid><startdate>20210701</startdate><enddate>20210701</enddate><creator>Bell, Bernard W.</creator><general>MIT Press</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>4T-</scope><scope>7TQ</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>DHY</scope><scope>DON</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>K9.</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20210701</creationdate><title>Replacing Bureaucrats with Automated Sorcerers?</title><author>Bell, Bernard W.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c414t-71e58891c7a075668cd50abd1a82c5a9422c1dfcb7b6cf0ff7d0384f0c7211f33</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2021</creationdate><topic>Administrative law</topic><topic>Ambition</topic><topic>Artificial intelligence</topic><topic>Decision making</topic><topic>Enforcement</topic><topic>Government agencies</topic><topic>Intelligence</topic><topic>Norms</topic><topic>Rationality</topic><topic>Regulation</topic><topic>Regulations</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Bell, Bernard W.</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Docstoc</collection><collection>PAIS Index</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>PAIS International</collection><collection>PAIS International (Ovid)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>ProQuest Health & Medical Complete (Alumni)</collection><jtitle>Daedalus (Cambridge, Mass.)</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext_linktorsrc</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Bell, Bernard W.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Replacing Bureaucrats with Automated Sorcerers?</atitle><jtitle>Daedalus (Cambridge, Mass.)</jtitle><date>2021-07-01</date><risdate>2021</risdate><volume>150</volume><issue>3</issue><spage>89</spage><epage>103</epage><pages>89-103</pages><issn>0011-5266</issn><eissn>1548-6192</eissn><abstract>Increasingly, federal agencies employ artificial intelligence to help direct their enforcement efforts, adjudicate claims and other matters, and craft regulations or regulatory approaches. 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subjects | Administrative law Ambition Artificial intelligence Decision making Enforcement Government agencies Intelligence Norms Rationality Regulation Regulations |
title | Replacing Bureaucrats with Automated Sorcerers? |
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