Route Selection Decision-Making in an Intermodal Transport Network Using Game Theory

Traveling through a transport network, or ordering and delivering packets, involves fundamental decision-making processes which can be approached by game theory: Rather than simply choosing a route, individuals need to evaluate routes in the presence of the congestion resulting from the decisions ma...

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Veröffentlicht in:Sustainability 2021-04, Vol.13 (8), p.4443
Hauptverfasser: Bukvić, Lucija, Pašagić Škrinjar, Jasmina, Abramović, Borna, Zitrický, Vladislav
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container_issue 8
container_start_page 4443
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creator Bukvić, Lucija
Pašagić Škrinjar, Jasmina
Abramović, Borna
Zitrický, Vladislav
description Traveling through a transport network, or ordering and delivering packets, involves fundamental decision-making processes which can be approached by game theory: Rather than simply choosing a route, individuals need to evaluate routes in the presence of the congestion resulting from the decisions made by themselves and everyone else. In this paper, a game theory model for resolving route choices in transport network graphs is used. In the process of doing this, discovering a rather unexpected result known as Braess’s paradox, which shows that adding capacity to a network can sometimes actually cause congestion and an increase in transport costs. The decisions are made by non-cooperative players in a game theory environment known as prisoner’s dilemma. These methods are used to analyze routing problems by competing logistics operators on the transport network consisting of three Eastern Adriatic ports and an intermodal terminal in Budapest. The congestion game can be used in route selection regarding a decrease in transport costs for the carriers who are considered as rational players choosing the most sustainable solution.
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source MDPI - Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute; Elektronische Zeitschriftenbibliothek - Frei zugängliche E-Journals
subjects Congestion
Costs
Data envelopment analysis
Decision making
Decision theory
Equilibrium
Game theory
Logistics
Nobel prizes
Prisoners
Rationality
Route selection
title Route Selection Decision-Making in an Intermodal Transport Network Using Game Theory
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