Adaptive Contract Design for Crowdsourcing Markets: Bandit Algorithms for Repeated Principal-Agent Problems

Crowdsourcing markets have emerged as a popular platform for matching available workers with tasks to complete. The payment for a particular task is typically set by the task's requester, and may be adjusted based on the quality of the completed work, for example, through the use of "bonus...

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Veröffentlicht in:The Journal of artificial intelligence research 2016-01, Vol.55, p.317-359
Hauptverfasser: Ho, Chien-Ju, Slivkins, Aleksandrs, Vaughan, Jennifer Wortman
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Sprache:eng
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