Managerial ownership, audit committees and non-audit services

We extend prior research on corporate governance and non-audit services (NAS) by distinguishing between the management entrenchment region of management ownership and regions in which the interests of management and shareholders converge. Management entrenchment and convergence-of-interests regions...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Australian journal of management 2021-08, Vol.46 (3), p.409-436
Hauptverfasser: Shan, Yuan George, Troshani, Indrit, Loftus, Janice
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:We extend prior research on corporate governance and non-audit services (NAS) by distinguishing between the management entrenchment region of management ownership and regions in which the interests of management and shareholders converge. Management entrenchment and convergence-of-interests regions were estimated for our sample of 5198 Australian firm-years. NAS is negatively (positively) associated with management ownership in the convergence-of-interests (entrenchment) regions. However, using a sub-sample based on firms that have audit committees, we find the association between NAS and management ownership is confined to the entrenchment region, while audit committee strength is negatively associated with NAS fees across all management ownership regions.
ISSN:0312-8962
1327-2020
DOI:10.1177/0312896220945763