A Theory of Zombie Lending

An entrepreneur borrows from a relationship bank or the market. The bank has a higher cost of capital but produces private information over time. While the entrepreneur accumulates reputation as the lending relationship continues, asymmetric information is also developed between the bank/entrepreneu...

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Veröffentlicht in:	The Journal of finance (New York) 2021-08, Vol.76 (4), p.1813-1867
Hauptverfasser:	HU, YUNZHI, VARAS, FELIPE
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Asymmetric information Bank loans Banks (Finance) Business schools Businesspeople Capital Entrepreneurs Entrepreneurship Financial disclosure Zombies
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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