Designing an effective climate-policy mix: accounting for instrument synergy

We assess evidence from theoretical-modelling, empirical and experimental studies on how interactions between instruments of climate policy affect overall emissions reduction. Such interactions take the form of negative, zero or positive synergistic effects. The considered instruments comprise perfo...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Climate policy 2021-07, Vol.21 (6), p.745-764
Hauptverfasser: van den Bergh, J., Castro, J., Drews, S., Exadaktylos, F., Foramitti, J., Klein, F., Konc, T., Savin, I.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
container_end_page 764
container_issue 6
container_start_page 745
container_title Climate policy
container_volume 21
creator van den Bergh, J.
Castro, J.
Drews, S.
Exadaktylos, F.
Foramitti, J.
Klein, F.
Konc, T.
Savin, I.
description We assess evidence from theoretical-modelling, empirical and experimental studies on how interactions between instruments of climate policy affect overall emissions reduction. Such interactions take the form of negative, zero or positive synergistic effects. The considered instruments comprise performance and technical standards, carbon pricing, adoption subsidies, innovation support, and information provision. Based on the findings, we formulate climate-policy packages that avoid negative and employ positive synergies, and compare their strengths and weaknesses on other criteria. We note that the international context of climate policy has been neglected in assessments of policy mixes, and argue that transparency and harmonization of national policies may be key to a politically feasible path to meet global emission targets. This suggests limiting the complexity of climate-policy packages. Key policy insights Combining technical standards or targets, such as renewable-energy quota, or adoption subsidies with a carbon market can produce negative synergy, up to the point of adding no emissions reduction beyond the cap. For maximum emissions reduction, renewable energy policy should be combined with carbon taxation and target expensive reduction options not triggered by the tax. Evidence regarding synergy of information provision with pricing is mixed, indicating a tendency for complementary roles (zero synergy). Positive synergy is documented only for cases where information provision improves effectiveness of price instruments, e.g. by stimulating social imitation of low-carbon choices. We conclude that the most promising packages are combining innovation support and information provision with either a carbon tax and adoption subsidy, or with a carbon market. We further argue that the latter could have stronger potential to harmonize international policy, which would allow to strengthen mitigation policy over time.
doi_str_mv 10.1080/14693062.2021.1907276
format Article
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>proquest_econi</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2546428630</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>2546428630</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c475t-dfec24f0099fe5c9861fcfc623da41873724dffb7f5e6fe62d44ec77ee96c9553</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNp9kMtOwzAQRSMEEqXwCUiRWKfYjh8xK1B5SpXYwNoKzrhyldjFToD8PQ4tYsdqZnHuXM3JsnOMFhhV6BJTLkvEyYIgghdYIkEEP8hmWDBSCMrEYdoTU0zQcXYS4wYhzCUtZ9nqFqJdO-vWee1yMAZ0bz8g163t6h6KrW-tHvPOfl3ltdZ-cP3EGh9y62Ifhg5cn8fRQViPp9mRqdsIZ_s5z17v716Wj8Xq-eFpebMqNBWsL5pUQqhBSEoDTMuKY6ON5qRsaoorUQpCG2PehGHADXDSUApaCADJtWSsnGcXu7vb4N8HiL3a-CG4VKkIo5ySipcoUWxH6eBjDGDUNqSnwqgwUpM49StOTeLUXlzK5bscaO9s_EsJXhFZ4Z_T1zvEumSiqz99aBvV12Prgwm10ylW_t_yDfKpgBs</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>2546428630</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Designing an effective climate-policy mix: accounting for instrument synergy</title><source>PAIS Index</source><source>Taylor &amp; Francis:Master (3349 titles)</source><creator>van den Bergh, J. ; Castro, J. ; Drews, S. ; Exadaktylos, F. ; Foramitti, J. ; Klein, F. ; Konc, T. ; Savin, I.</creator><creatorcontrib>van den Bergh, J. ; Castro, J. ; Drews, S. ; Exadaktylos, F. ; Foramitti, J. ; Klein, F. ; Konc, T. ; Savin, I.</creatorcontrib><description>We assess evidence from theoretical-modelling, empirical and experimental studies on how interactions between instruments of climate policy affect overall emissions reduction. Such interactions take the form of negative, zero or positive synergistic effects. The considered instruments comprise performance and technical standards, carbon pricing, adoption subsidies, innovation support, and information provision. Based on the findings, we formulate climate-policy packages that avoid negative and employ positive synergies, and compare their strengths and weaknesses on other criteria. We note that the international context of climate policy has been neglected in assessments of policy mixes, and argue that transparency and harmonization of national policies may be key to a politically feasible path to meet global emission targets. This suggests limiting the complexity of climate-policy packages. Key policy insights Combining technical standards or targets, such as renewable-energy quota, or adoption subsidies with a carbon market can produce negative synergy, up to the point of adding no emissions reduction beyond the cap. For maximum emissions reduction, renewable energy policy should be combined with carbon taxation and target expensive reduction options not triggered by the tax. Evidence regarding synergy of information provision with pricing is mixed, indicating a tendency for complementary roles (zero synergy). Positive synergy is documented only for cases where information provision improves effectiveness of price instruments, e.g. by stimulating social imitation of low-carbon choices. We conclude that the most promising packages are combining innovation support and information provision with either a carbon tax and adoption subsidy, or with a carbon market. We further argue that the latter could have stronger potential to harmonize international policy, which would allow to strengthen mitigation policy over time.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1469-3062</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1752-7457</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1080/14693062.2021.1907276</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>London: Taylor &amp; Francis</publisher><subject>adoption and innovation subsidies ; Adoption of innovations ; Carbon ; carbon pricing ; Climate ; Climate models ; Climate policy ; Emissions control ; Energy policies ; Energy policy ; Environmental management ; Environmental policy ; Environmental tax ; Foreign policy ; Harmonization ; Imitation ; Information ; information provision ; Information sharing ; Innovation ; Innovations ; Instrument interaction ; Instruments ; International policies ; International policy ; Market prices ; Markets ; Mitigation ; mitigation policy packages ; Packages ; Pricing ; Renewable energy ; Renewable resources ; Resource management ; Subsidies ; Synergistic effect ; Synergy ; Taxation ; technical standards ; Transparency ; Transparency (optical)</subject><ispartof>Climate policy, 2021-07, Vol.21 (6), p.745-764</ispartof><rights>2021 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor &amp; Francis Group 2021</rights><rights>2021 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor &amp; Francis Group</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c475t-dfec24f0099fe5c9861fcfc623da41873724dffb7f5e6fe62d44ec77ee96c9553</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c475t-dfec24f0099fe5c9861fcfc623da41873724dffb7f5e6fe62d44ec77ee96c9553</cites><orcidid>0000-0003-3415-3083</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14693062.2021.1907276$$EPDF$$P50$$Ginformaworld$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14693062.2021.1907276$$EHTML$$P50$$Ginformaworld$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,27864,27922,27923,59645,60434</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>van den Bergh, J.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Castro, J.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Drews, S.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Exadaktylos, F.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Foramitti, J.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Klein, F.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Konc, T.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Savin, I.</creatorcontrib><title>Designing an effective climate-policy mix: accounting for instrument synergy</title><title>Climate policy</title><description>We assess evidence from theoretical-modelling, empirical and experimental studies on how interactions between instruments of climate policy affect overall emissions reduction. Such interactions take the form of negative, zero or positive synergistic effects. The considered instruments comprise performance and technical standards, carbon pricing, adoption subsidies, innovation support, and information provision. Based on the findings, we formulate climate-policy packages that avoid negative and employ positive synergies, and compare their strengths and weaknesses on other criteria. We note that the international context of climate policy has been neglected in assessments of policy mixes, and argue that transparency and harmonization of national policies may be key to a politically feasible path to meet global emission targets. This suggests limiting the complexity of climate-policy packages. Key policy insights Combining technical standards or targets, such as renewable-energy quota, or adoption subsidies with a carbon market can produce negative synergy, up to the point of adding no emissions reduction beyond the cap. For maximum emissions reduction, renewable energy policy should be combined with carbon taxation and target expensive reduction options not triggered by the tax. Evidence regarding synergy of information provision with pricing is mixed, indicating a tendency for complementary roles (zero synergy). Positive synergy is documented only for cases where information provision improves effectiveness of price instruments, e.g. by stimulating social imitation of low-carbon choices. We conclude that the most promising packages are combining innovation support and information provision with either a carbon tax and adoption subsidy, or with a carbon market. We further argue that the latter could have stronger potential to harmonize international policy, which would allow to strengthen mitigation policy over time.</description><subject>adoption and innovation subsidies</subject><subject>Adoption of innovations</subject><subject>Carbon</subject><subject>carbon pricing</subject><subject>Climate</subject><subject>Climate models</subject><subject>Climate policy</subject><subject>Emissions control</subject><subject>Energy policies</subject><subject>Energy policy</subject><subject>Environmental management</subject><subject>Environmental policy</subject><subject>Environmental tax</subject><subject>Foreign policy</subject><subject>Harmonization</subject><subject>Imitation</subject><subject>Information</subject><subject>information provision</subject><subject>Information sharing</subject><subject>Innovation</subject><subject>Innovations</subject><subject>Instrument interaction</subject><subject>Instruments</subject><subject>International policies</subject><subject>International policy</subject><subject>Market prices</subject><subject>Markets</subject><subject>Mitigation</subject><subject>mitigation policy packages</subject><subject>Packages</subject><subject>Pricing</subject><subject>Renewable energy</subject><subject>Renewable resources</subject><subject>Resource management</subject><subject>Subsidies</subject><subject>Synergistic effect</subject><subject>Synergy</subject><subject>Taxation</subject><subject>technical standards</subject><subject>Transparency</subject><subject>Transparency (optical)</subject><issn>1469-3062</issn><issn>1752-7457</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2021</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7TQ</sourceid><recordid>eNp9kMtOwzAQRSMEEqXwCUiRWKfYjh8xK1B5SpXYwNoKzrhyldjFToD8PQ4tYsdqZnHuXM3JsnOMFhhV6BJTLkvEyYIgghdYIkEEP8hmWDBSCMrEYdoTU0zQcXYS4wYhzCUtZ9nqFqJdO-vWee1yMAZ0bz8g163t6h6KrW-tHvPOfl3ltdZ-cP3EGh9y62Ifhg5cn8fRQViPp9mRqdsIZ_s5z17v716Wj8Xq-eFpebMqNBWsL5pUQqhBSEoDTMuKY6ON5qRsaoorUQpCG2PehGHADXDSUApaCADJtWSsnGcXu7vb4N8HiL3a-CG4VKkIo5ySipcoUWxH6eBjDGDUNqSnwqgwUpM49StOTeLUXlzK5bscaO9s_EsJXhFZ4Z_T1zvEumSiqz99aBvV12Prgwm10ylW_t_yDfKpgBs</recordid><startdate>20210703</startdate><enddate>20210703</enddate><creator>van den Bergh, J.</creator><creator>Castro, J.</creator><creator>Drews, S.</creator><creator>Exadaktylos, F.</creator><creator>Foramitti, J.</creator><creator>Klein, F.</creator><creator>Konc, T.</creator><creator>Savin, I.</creator><general>Taylor &amp; Francis</general><general>Taylor &amp; Francis Ltd</general><scope>OQ6</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>4T-</scope><scope>7ST</scope><scope>7TA</scope><scope>7TG</scope><scope>7TQ</scope><scope>7U6</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>8FD</scope><scope>C1K</scope><scope>DHY</scope><scope>DON</scope><scope>F1W</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>FR3</scope><scope>H97</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>JG9</scope><scope>KL.</scope><scope>KR7</scope><scope>L.G</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3415-3083</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>20210703</creationdate><title>Designing an effective climate-policy mix: accounting for instrument synergy</title><author>van den Bergh, J. ; Castro, J. ; Drews, S. ; Exadaktylos, F. ; Foramitti, J. ; Klein, F. ; Konc, T. ; Savin, I.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c475t-dfec24f0099fe5c9861fcfc623da41873724dffb7f5e6fe62d44ec77ee96c9553</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2021</creationdate><topic>adoption and innovation subsidies</topic><topic>Adoption of innovations</topic><topic>Carbon</topic><topic>carbon pricing</topic><topic>Climate</topic><topic>Climate models</topic><topic>Climate policy</topic><topic>Emissions control</topic><topic>Energy policies</topic><topic>Energy policy</topic><topic>Environmental management</topic><topic>Environmental policy</topic><topic>Environmental tax</topic><topic>Foreign policy</topic><topic>Harmonization</topic><topic>Imitation</topic><topic>Information</topic><topic>information provision</topic><topic>Information sharing</topic><topic>Innovation</topic><topic>Innovations</topic><topic>Instrument interaction</topic><topic>Instruments</topic><topic>International policies</topic><topic>International policy</topic><topic>Market prices</topic><topic>Markets</topic><topic>Mitigation</topic><topic>mitigation policy packages</topic><topic>Packages</topic><topic>Pricing</topic><topic>Renewable energy</topic><topic>Renewable resources</topic><topic>Resource management</topic><topic>Subsidies</topic><topic>Synergistic effect</topic><topic>Synergy</topic><topic>Taxation</topic><topic>technical standards</topic><topic>Transparency</topic><topic>Transparency (optical)</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>van den Bergh, J.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Castro, J.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Drews, S.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Exadaktylos, F.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Foramitti, J.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Klein, F.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Konc, T.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Savin, I.</creatorcontrib><collection>ECONIS</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Docstoc</collection><collection>Environment Abstracts</collection><collection>Materials Business File</collection><collection>Meteorological &amp; Geoastrophysical Abstracts</collection><collection>PAIS Index</collection><collection>Sustainability Science Abstracts</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>Technology Research Database</collection><collection>Environmental Sciences and Pollution Management</collection><collection>PAIS International</collection><collection>PAIS International (Ovid)</collection><collection>ASFA: Aquatic Sciences and Fisheries Abstracts</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>Engineering Research Database</collection><collection>Aquatic Science &amp; Fisheries Abstracts (ASFA) 3: Aquatic Pollution &amp; Environmental Quality</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>Materials Research Database</collection><collection>Meteorological &amp; Geoastrophysical Abstracts - Academic</collection><collection>Civil Engineering Abstracts</collection><collection>Aquatic Science &amp; Fisheries Abstracts (ASFA) Professional</collection><jtitle>Climate policy</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>van den Bergh, J.</au><au>Castro, J.</au><au>Drews, S.</au><au>Exadaktylos, F.</au><au>Foramitti, J.</au><au>Klein, F.</au><au>Konc, T.</au><au>Savin, I.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Designing an effective climate-policy mix: accounting for instrument synergy</atitle><jtitle>Climate policy</jtitle><date>2021-07-03</date><risdate>2021</risdate><volume>21</volume><issue>6</issue><spage>745</spage><epage>764</epage><pages>745-764</pages><issn>1469-3062</issn><eissn>1752-7457</eissn><abstract>We assess evidence from theoretical-modelling, empirical and experimental studies on how interactions between instruments of climate policy affect overall emissions reduction. Such interactions take the form of negative, zero or positive synergistic effects. The considered instruments comprise performance and technical standards, carbon pricing, adoption subsidies, innovation support, and information provision. Based on the findings, we formulate climate-policy packages that avoid negative and employ positive synergies, and compare their strengths and weaknesses on other criteria. We note that the international context of climate policy has been neglected in assessments of policy mixes, and argue that transparency and harmonization of national policies may be key to a politically feasible path to meet global emission targets. This suggests limiting the complexity of climate-policy packages. Key policy insights Combining technical standards or targets, such as renewable-energy quota, or adoption subsidies with a carbon market can produce negative synergy, up to the point of adding no emissions reduction beyond the cap. For maximum emissions reduction, renewable energy policy should be combined with carbon taxation and target expensive reduction options not triggered by the tax. Evidence regarding synergy of information provision with pricing is mixed, indicating a tendency for complementary roles (zero synergy). Positive synergy is documented only for cases where information provision improves effectiveness of price instruments, e.g. by stimulating social imitation of low-carbon choices. We conclude that the most promising packages are combining innovation support and information provision with either a carbon tax and adoption subsidy, or with a carbon market. We further argue that the latter could have stronger potential to harmonize international policy, which would allow to strengthen mitigation policy over time.</abstract><cop>London</cop><pub>Taylor &amp; Francis</pub><doi>10.1080/14693062.2021.1907276</doi><tpages>20</tpages><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3415-3083</orcidid><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext
identifier ISSN: 1469-3062
ispartof Climate policy, 2021-07, Vol.21 (6), p.745-764
issn 1469-3062
1752-7457
language eng
recordid cdi_proquest_journals_2546428630
source PAIS Index; Taylor & Francis:Master (3349 titles)
subjects adoption and innovation subsidies
Adoption of innovations
Carbon
carbon pricing
Climate
Climate models
Climate policy
Emissions control
Energy policies
Energy policy
Environmental management
Environmental policy
Environmental tax
Foreign policy
Harmonization
Imitation
Information
information provision
Information sharing
Innovation
Innovations
Instrument interaction
Instruments
International policies
International policy
Market prices
Markets
Mitigation
mitigation policy packages
Packages
Pricing
Renewable energy
Renewable resources
Resource management
Subsidies
Synergistic effect
Synergy
Taxation
technical standards
Transparency
Transparency (optical)
title Designing an effective climate-policy mix: accounting for instrument synergy
url https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-14T05%3A00%3A59IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_econi&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Designing%20an%20effective%20climate-policy%20mix:%20accounting%20for%20instrument%20synergy&rft.jtitle=Climate%20policy&rft.au=van%20den%20Bergh,%20J.&rft.date=2021-07-03&rft.volume=21&rft.issue=6&rft.spage=745&rft.epage=764&rft.pages=745-764&rft.issn=1469-3062&rft.eissn=1752-7457&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080/14693062.2021.1907276&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_econi%3E2546428630%3C/proquest_econi%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=2546428630&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true