Designing an effective climate-policy mix: accounting for instrument synergy
We assess evidence from theoretical-modelling, empirical and experimental studies on how interactions between instruments of climate policy affect overall emissions reduction. Such interactions take the form of negative, zero or positive synergistic effects. The considered instruments comprise perfo...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Climate policy 2021-07, Vol.21 (6), p.745-764 |
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description | We assess evidence from theoretical-modelling, empirical and experimental studies on how interactions between instruments of climate policy affect overall emissions reduction. Such interactions take the form of negative, zero or positive synergistic effects. The considered instruments comprise performance and technical standards, carbon pricing, adoption subsidies, innovation support, and information provision. Based on the findings, we formulate climate-policy packages that avoid negative and employ positive synergies, and compare their strengths and weaknesses on other criteria. We note that the international context of climate policy has been neglected in assessments of policy mixes, and argue that transparency and harmonization of national policies may be key to a politically feasible path to meet global emission targets. This suggests limiting the complexity of climate-policy packages.
Key policy insights
Combining technical standards or targets, such as renewable-energy quota, or adoption subsidies with a carbon market can produce negative synergy, up to the point of adding no emissions reduction beyond the cap. For maximum emissions reduction, renewable energy policy should be combined with carbon taxation and target expensive reduction options not triggered by the tax.
Evidence regarding synergy of information provision with pricing is mixed, indicating a tendency for complementary roles (zero synergy). Positive synergy is documented only for cases where information provision improves effectiveness of price instruments, e.g. by stimulating social imitation of low-carbon choices.
We conclude that the most promising packages are combining innovation support and information provision with either a carbon tax and adoption subsidy, or with a carbon market. We further argue that the latter could have stronger potential to harmonize international policy, which would allow to strengthen mitigation policy over time. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1080/14693062.2021.1907276 |
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Key policy insights
Combining technical standards or targets, such as renewable-energy quota, or adoption subsidies with a carbon market can produce negative synergy, up to the point of adding no emissions reduction beyond the cap. For maximum emissions reduction, renewable energy policy should be combined with carbon taxation and target expensive reduction options not triggered by the tax.
Evidence regarding synergy of information provision with pricing is mixed, indicating a tendency for complementary roles (zero synergy). Positive synergy is documented only for cases where information provision improves effectiveness of price instruments, e.g. by stimulating social imitation of low-carbon choices.
We conclude that the most promising packages are combining innovation support and information provision with either a carbon tax and adoption subsidy, or with a carbon market. We further argue that the latter could have stronger potential to harmonize international policy, which would allow to strengthen mitigation policy over time.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1469-3062</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1752-7457</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1080/14693062.2021.1907276</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>London: Taylor & Francis</publisher><subject>adoption and innovation subsidies ; Adoption of innovations ; Carbon ; carbon pricing ; Climate ; Climate models ; Climate policy ; Emissions control ; Energy policies ; Energy policy ; Environmental management ; Environmental policy ; Environmental tax ; Foreign policy ; Harmonization ; Imitation ; Information ; information provision ; Information sharing ; Innovation ; Innovations ; Instrument interaction ; Instruments ; International policies ; International policy ; Market prices ; Markets ; Mitigation ; mitigation policy packages ; Packages ; Pricing ; Renewable energy ; Renewable resources ; Resource management ; Subsidies ; Synergistic effect ; Synergy ; Taxation ; technical standards ; Transparency ; Transparency (optical)</subject><ispartof>Climate policy, 2021-07, Vol.21 (6), p.745-764</ispartof><rights>2021 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group 2021</rights><rights>2021 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c475t-dfec24f0099fe5c9861fcfc623da41873724dffb7f5e6fe62d44ec77ee96c9553</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c475t-dfec24f0099fe5c9861fcfc623da41873724dffb7f5e6fe62d44ec77ee96c9553</cites><orcidid>0000-0003-3415-3083</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14693062.2021.1907276$$EPDF$$P50$$Ginformaworld$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14693062.2021.1907276$$EHTML$$P50$$Ginformaworld$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,27864,27922,27923,59645,60434</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>van den Bergh, J.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Castro, J.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Drews, S.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Exadaktylos, F.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Foramitti, J.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Klein, F.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Konc, T.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Savin, I.</creatorcontrib><title>Designing an effective climate-policy mix: accounting for instrument synergy</title><title>Climate policy</title><description>We assess evidence from theoretical-modelling, empirical and experimental studies on how interactions between instruments of climate policy affect overall emissions reduction. Such interactions take the form of negative, zero or positive synergistic effects. The considered instruments comprise performance and technical standards, carbon pricing, adoption subsidies, innovation support, and information provision. Based on the findings, we formulate climate-policy packages that avoid negative and employ positive synergies, and compare their strengths and weaknesses on other criteria. We note that the international context of climate policy has been neglected in assessments of policy mixes, and argue that transparency and harmonization of national policies may be key to a politically feasible path to meet global emission targets. This suggests limiting the complexity of climate-policy packages.
Key policy insights
Combining technical standards or targets, such as renewable-energy quota, or adoption subsidies with a carbon market can produce negative synergy, up to the point of adding no emissions reduction beyond the cap. For maximum emissions reduction, renewable energy policy should be combined with carbon taxation and target expensive reduction options not triggered by the tax.
Evidence regarding synergy of information provision with pricing is mixed, indicating a tendency for complementary roles (zero synergy). Positive synergy is documented only for cases where information provision improves effectiveness of price instruments, e.g. by stimulating social imitation of low-carbon choices.
We conclude that the most promising packages are combining innovation support and information provision with either a carbon tax and adoption subsidy, or with a carbon market. We further argue that the latter could have stronger potential to harmonize international policy, which would allow to strengthen mitigation policy over time.</description><subject>adoption and innovation subsidies</subject><subject>Adoption of innovations</subject><subject>Carbon</subject><subject>carbon pricing</subject><subject>Climate</subject><subject>Climate models</subject><subject>Climate policy</subject><subject>Emissions control</subject><subject>Energy policies</subject><subject>Energy policy</subject><subject>Environmental management</subject><subject>Environmental policy</subject><subject>Environmental tax</subject><subject>Foreign policy</subject><subject>Harmonization</subject><subject>Imitation</subject><subject>Information</subject><subject>information provision</subject><subject>Information sharing</subject><subject>Innovation</subject><subject>Innovations</subject><subject>Instrument interaction</subject><subject>Instruments</subject><subject>International policies</subject><subject>International policy</subject><subject>Market prices</subject><subject>Markets</subject><subject>Mitigation</subject><subject>mitigation policy packages</subject><subject>Packages</subject><subject>Pricing</subject><subject>Renewable energy</subject><subject>Renewable resources</subject><subject>Resource management</subject><subject>Subsidies</subject><subject>Synergistic effect</subject><subject>Synergy</subject><subject>Taxation</subject><subject>technical standards</subject><subject>Transparency</subject><subject>Transparency (optical)</subject><issn>1469-3062</issn><issn>1752-7457</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2021</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7TQ</sourceid><recordid>eNp9kMtOwzAQRSMEEqXwCUiRWKfYjh8xK1B5SpXYwNoKzrhyldjFToD8PQ4tYsdqZnHuXM3JsnOMFhhV6BJTLkvEyYIgghdYIkEEP8hmWDBSCMrEYdoTU0zQcXYS4wYhzCUtZ9nqFqJdO-vWee1yMAZ0bz8g163t6h6KrW-tHvPOfl3ltdZ-cP3EGh9y62Ifhg5cn8fRQViPp9mRqdsIZ_s5z17v716Wj8Xq-eFpebMqNBWsL5pUQqhBSEoDTMuKY6ON5qRsaoorUQpCG2PehGHADXDSUApaCADJtWSsnGcXu7vb4N8HiL3a-CG4VKkIo5ySipcoUWxH6eBjDGDUNqSnwqgwUpM49StOTeLUXlzK5bscaO9s_EsJXhFZ4Z_T1zvEumSiqz99aBvV12Prgwm10ylW_t_yDfKpgBs</recordid><startdate>20210703</startdate><enddate>20210703</enddate><creator>van den Bergh, J.</creator><creator>Castro, J.</creator><creator>Drews, S.</creator><creator>Exadaktylos, F.</creator><creator>Foramitti, J.</creator><creator>Klein, F.</creator><creator>Konc, T.</creator><creator>Savin, I.</creator><general>Taylor & Francis</general><general>Taylor & Francis Ltd</general><scope>OQ6</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>4T-</scope><scope>7ST</scope><scope>7TA</scope><scope>7TG</scope><scope>7TQ</scope><scope>7U6</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>8FD</scope><scope>C1K</scope><scope>DHY</scope><scope>DON</scope><scope>F1W</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>FR3</scope><scope>H97</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>JG9</scope><scope>KL.</scope><scope>KR7</scope><scope>L.G</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3415-3083</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>20210703</creationdate><title>Designing an effective climate-policy mix: accounting for instrument synergy</title><author>van den Bergh, J. ; Castro, J. ; Drews, S. ; Exadaktylos, F. ; Foramitti, J. ; Klein, F. ; Konc, T. ; Savin, I.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c475t-dfec24f0099fe5c9861fcfc623da41873724dffb7f5e6fe62d44ec77ee96c9553</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2021</creationdate><topic>adoption and innovation subsidies</topic><topic>Adoption of innovations</topic><topic>Carbon</topic><topic>carbon pricing</topic><topic>Climate</topic><topic>Climate models</topic><topic>Climate policy</topic><topic>Emissions control</topic><topic>Energy policies</topic><topic>Energy policy</topic><topic>Environmental management</topic><topic>Environmental policy</topic><topic>Environmental tax</topic><topic>Foreign policy</topic><topic>Harmonization</topic><topic>Imitation</topic><topic>Information</topic><topic>information provision</topic><topic>Information sharing</topic><topic>Innovation</topic><topic>Innovations</topic><topic>Instrument interaction</topic><topic>Instruments</topic><topic>International policies</topic><topic>International policy</topic><topic>Market prices</topic><topic>Markets</topic><topic>Mitigation</topic><topic>mitigation policy packages</topic><topic>Packages</topic><topic>Pricing</topic><topic>Renewable energy</topic><topic>Renewable resources</topic><topic>Resource management</topic><topic>Subsidies</topic><topic>Synergistic effect</topic><topic>Synergy</topic><topic>Taxation</topic><topic>technical standards</topic><topic>Transparency</topic><topic>Transparency (optical)</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>van den Bergh, J.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Castro, J.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Drews, S.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Exadaktylos, F.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Foramitti, J.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Klein, F.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Konc, T.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Savin, I.</creatorcontrib><collection>ECONIS</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Docstoc</collection><collection>Environment Abstracts</collection><collection>Materials Business File</collection><collection>Meteorological & Geoastrophysical Abstracts</collection><collection>PAIS Index</collection><collection>Sustainability Science Abstracts</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>Technology Research Database</collection><collection>Environmental Sciences and Pollution Management</collection><collection>PAIS International</collection><collection>PAIS International (Ovid)</collection><collection>ASFA: Aquatic Sciences and Fisheries Abstracts</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>Engineering Research Database</collection><collection>Aquatic Science & Fisheries Abstracts (ASFA) 3: Aquatic Pollution & Environmental Quality</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>Materials Research Database</collection><collection>Meteorological & Geoastrophysical Abstracts - Academic</collection><collection>Civil Engineering Abstracts</collection><collection>Aquatic Science & Fisheries Abstracts (ASFA) Professional</collection><jtitle>Climate policy</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>van den Bergh, J.</au><au>Castro, J.</au><au>Drews, S.</au><au>Exadaktylos, F.</au><au>Foramitti, J.</au><au>Klein, F.</au><au>Konc, T.</au><au>Savin, I.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Designing an effective climate-policy mix: accounting for instrument synergy</atitle><jtitle>Climate policy</jtitle><date>2021-07-03</date><risdate>2021</risdate><volume>21</volume><issue>6</issue><spage>745</spage><epage>764</epage><pages>745-764</pages><issn>1469-3062</issn><eissn>1752-7457</eissn><abstract>We assess evidence from theoretical-modelling, empirical and experimental studies on how interactions between instruments of climate policy affect overall emissions reduction. Such interactions take the form of negative, zero or positive synergistic effects. The considered instruments comprise performance and technical standards, carbon pricing, adoption subsidies, innovation support, and information provision. Based on the findings, we formulate climate-policy packages that avoid negative and employ positive synergies, and compare their strengths and weaknesses on other criteria. We note that the international context of climate policy has been neglected in assessments of policy mixes, and argue that transparency and harmonization of national policies may be key to a politically feasible path to meet global emission targets. This suggests limiting the complexity of climate-policy packages.
Key policy insights
Combining technical standards or targets, such as renewable-energy quota, or adoption subsidies with a carbon market can produce negative synergy, up to the point of adding no emissions reduction beyond the cap. For maximum emissions reduction, renewable energy policy should be combined with carbon taxation and target expensive reduction options not triggered by the tax.
Evidence regarding synergy of information provision with pricing is mixed, indicating a tendency for complementary roles (zero synergy). Positive synergy is documented only for cases where information provision improves effectiveness of price instruments, e.g. by stimulating social imitation of low-carbon choices.
We conclude that the most promising packages are combining innovation support and information provision with either a carbon tax and adoption subsidy, or with a carbon market. We further argue that the latter could have stronger potential to harmonize international policy, which would allow to strengthen mitigation policy over time.</abstract><cop>London</cop><pub>Taylor & Francis</pub><doi>10.1080/14693062.2021.1907276</doi><tpages>20</tpages><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3415-3083</orcidid><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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subjects | adoption and innovation subsidies Adoption of innovations Carbon carbon pricing Climate Climate models Climate policy Emissions control Energy policies Energy policy Environmental management Environmental policy Environmental tax Foreign policy Harmonization Imitation Information information provision Information sharing Innovation Innovations Instrument interaction Instruments International policies International policy Market prices Markets Mitigation mitigation policy packages Packages Pricing Renewable energy Renewable resources Resource management Subsidies Synergistic effect Synergy Taxation technical standards Transparency Transparency (optical) |
title | Designing an effective climate-policy mix: accounting for instrument synergy |
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