Towards an Administrative Law of Central Banking

A world in turmoil caused by Covid-19 has revealed again what has long been true: the Federal Reserve is arguably the most powerful administrative agency in government, but neither administrative-law scholars nor the Fed itself treat it that way In this Article, we present the first effort to map th...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Yale journal on regulation 2021-12, Vol.38 (1), p.1-89
Hauptverfasser:	Conti-Brown, Peter, Listokin, Yair, Parrillo, Nicholas R
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Administrative law Banking Banking industry Central banks Citizen participation Congressional investigations Contours Coronaviruses COVID-19 Federal regulation Federal Reserve monetary policy Flexibility Inflation Judicial reviews Monetary policy Openness Policy making Power Signaling Transparency
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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