Weaponizing the Offiffice of Legal Counsel
This Article argues that the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)-an office within the Justice Department that issues legal opinions that govern executive branch actors-arms the executive branch with a powerful weapon to deploy in its conflicts with Congress. Despite its reputation as a neutral arbiter of...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Boston College law review 2021-01, Vol.62 (2), p.514-569 |
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description | This Article argues that the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)-an office within the Justice Department that issues legal opinions that govern executive branch actors-arms the executive branch with a powerful weapon to deploy in its conflicts with Congress. Despite its reputation as a neutral arbiter of constitutional questions, OLC's separation-of-powers opinions do not simply describe the executive's view of the law; they actually augment executive powers vis-a-vis Congress. This novel argument emerges from two descriptive claims laid out in this Article. The first is that OLC's institutional design guarantees that its separation-of-powers opinions will articulate a decidedly pro-executive view of the law. The second is that these executive-friendly legal analyses not only guide the actions of executive officials, but also shape the legal landscape outside the executive branch. In other words, OLC makes its own legal reality: its separation-ofpowers opinions first envision a world that values executive branch prerogatives over congressional interests, and then, by their very existence, help realize that vision. The result is that OLC provides the executive with a powerful weapon in its inter-branch disputes with Congress-a phenomenon that to date has gone unremarked. After identifying the mechanisms through which OLC places a thumb on the executive's side of the scale in inter-branch disputes, this Article suggests several ways that Congress could level the playing field. |
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The result is that OLC provides the executive with a powerful weapon in its inter-branch disputes with Congress-a phenomenon that to date has gone unremarked. 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Despite its reputation as a neutral arbiter of constitutional questions, OLC's separation-of-powers opinions do not simply describe the executive's view of the law; they actually augment executive powers vis-a-vis Congress. This novel argument emerges from two descriptive claims laid out in this Article. The first is that OLC's institutional design guarantees that its separation-of-powers opinions will articulate a decidedly pro-executive view of the law. The second is that these executive-friendly legal analyses not only guide the actions of executive officials, but also shape the legal landscape outside the executive branch. In other words, OLC makes its own legal reality: its separation-ofpowers opinions first envision a world that values executive branch prerogatives over congressional interests, and then, by their very existence, help realize that vision. 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law review</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Berman, Emily</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Weaponizing the Offiffice of Legal Counsel</atitle><jtitle>Boston College law review</jtitle><date>2021-01-01</date><risdate>2021</risdate><volume>62</volume><issue>2</issue><spage>514</spage><epage>569</epage><pages>514-569</pages><issn>0161-6587</issn><eissn>1930-661X</eissn><abstract>This Article argues that the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)-an office within the Justice Department that issues legal opinions that govern executive branch actors-arms the executive branch with a powerful weapon to deploy in its conflicts with Congress. Despite its reputation as a neutral arbiter of constitutional questions, OLC's separation-of-powers opinions do not simply describe the executive's view of the law; they actually augment executive powers vis-a-vis Congress. This novel argument emerges from two descriptive claims laid out in this Article. The first is that OLC's institutional design guarantees that its separation-of-powers opinions will articulate a decidedly pro-executive view of the law. The second is that these executive-friendly legal analyses not only guide the actions of executive officials, but also shape the legal landscape outside the executive branch. In other words, OLC makes its own legal reality: its separation-ofpowers opinions first envision a world that values executive branch prerogatives over congressional interests, and then, by their very existence, help realize that vision. 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subjects | Access to information Executive privilege Law Legal counsel Politics Power Presidents Public opinion Reputations Scandals Subpoenas Trump, Donald J |
title | Weaponizing the Offiffice of Legal Counsel |
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